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Smart Media Tokens

A Token Protocol for Content Websites, Applications, Online Communities and Guilds Seeking Funding, Monetization and User Growth

SBJ's Smart Media Tokens give anyone the power to launch and sell [Proof-of-Brain \[1\]](#) tokens, which are tokens distributed by “upvote” and “like”-based algorithms and can be integrated with websites to align incentives and spur growth, while websites are empowered to adopt sustainable, currency-centric revenue models. This model has been tested and continues to be proven by [SBJit.com](#), [busy.org](#), [chainbb.com](#), [dsound.audio](#), [dtube.video](#) and other SBJinterfaces, which are monetizing content, tokens and media in a way never before seen.

Several popular token protocols, such as Ethereum's ERC-20, allow you to create and launch arbitrary tokens, but no protocol enables content businesses to leverage those tokens by aligning incentives between users and applications. Due to suboptimal transaction cost structures that incur fees for basic actions such as voting or posting, misalignment of interests between meta and core tokens that aren't built for influencing distributions based on Proof-of-Brain, private key hierarchies that don't cater to social versus financial operations, and slow transaction speeds that are out of sync with real-time websites - none of these protocols could ever provide an acceptable user experience for content websites, such as Twitter, Reddit (even subreddits) or The New York Times.

For content websites and tokens, incentive alignment between websites and users comes from a steady, as well as decentralized and mathematically guaranteed, release of new tokens, and incentives that must be allocated to the users - including bloggers, vloggers, commenters and curators. The distribution of new tokens occurs based on stake-weighted voting to prevent gaming and eliminate the need for a counterparty. Quality user experience comes from tokens that can be transacted safely (through separate private keys for distinct sets of actions), without fees, and at real-time speeds. Further incentive alignment comes from a company's ability to raise capital in ICOs. All Smart Media Tokens have built-in ICO support, should the issuer wish to launch one.

Table of Contents

[Document Metadata](#)

1

Smart Media Tokens	1
A Token Protocol for Content Websites, Applications, Online Communities and Guilds Seeking Funding, Monetization and User Growth	1
Introduction	5
Leveraging Tokens for Autonomous User Growth	5
New Fundraising Opportunities	6
Immediate Liquidity	6
Shared Bootstrap Tools	6
Monetizing with Shared Token Rewards	6
Can My Entity Participate in SBJs?	7
Use Cases	7
1 - Content Publishers - Single Token Support	7
2 - Forums - Multiple Token Support	8
3 - Comments Widget for Online Publishers	9
4 - Sub-Community Moderators and Managers	10
5 - Arbitrary Assets - Tokens Representing Real World Assets	11
Owner's manual	12
Create a control account	12
Control account security	13
Token consensus	13
Token Generation and Initialized Parameters	13
SBJobject creation	13
SBJpre-setup	14
SBJsetup	15
Token units	16
Unit ratios	16
Cap and min	16
Hidden caps	17
Generation policy data structure	18
Examples and rationale	18
Launch	20
Full JSON examples	21
Inflation Parameters	29
Named token parameters	33
Parameter constraints	34
SBJvesting semantics	34
Content rewards	35
Curve definitions	36
Target votes per day	38
SBJSetup GUI Sketch	39
Votability and Rewardability	40
Static Token Parameters	41
Mandatory token parameters	42
SBJinteraction with existing operations	42
Automated Market Makers for SBJs	43
Setup	43
Basic Definitions	43
Notes on Conventions	43

Finite Trades	44
Basic Definitions	44
Computing the Restoring Trade	44
Computing the Equilibrium Price	44
Example	45
Infinitesimal Trades	46
Setting up the Problem	46
Solving the DE's	46
Qualitative discussion	47
FAQ	47
Costs of SBJ Operations And Bandwidth Rate Limiting	50
Fee-less Operations Necessary for Quality User Experience	51
Decentralized Exchange	51
Automatic Order Matching	51
Diverse Asset Types	51
Zero Trading and Transfer Fees	52
Augmenting SBJs with Additional Native Contracts	52
Community Building with Paid Positions	52
Democratic SBJs using Whitelist Oracles	53
Secondary ICOs for Contiguous Fundraising	53
Bandwidth Sharing with SBJs Based on Reserve Liquidity Pools	53
What Makes SBJs Better Suited to Application-Specific Blockchains, such as SBJ, than Application-General Blockchains, such as Ethereum?	53
SBJs are Safer and More Cost Effective in Application-Specific Blockchain Environments	54
SBJs on SBJ have Aligned Proof-of-Brain Incentives with the Core Token	54
SBJs on SBJ have Transaction Pricing that Contributes to a Quality User Experience	55
SBJs Benefit from a Blockchain that has Scaling Processes Programmed to a Specialized Set of Applications	55
SBJs Benefit from a Blockchain with Content Management System (CMS) Primitives	56
Increasing Market Demand for SBJ with SBJs and Implicit Value Drivers rather than Fees	56
SBJ Purchased for Transaction Bandwidth Enables Maximally Profitable Participation across SBJs	56
SBJ Supply is Locked into Liquidity Pools by Automated Market Makers	56
SBJ and SBJ Demand Increases with Advent of New Powers of Influence	57
SBJ Demand Increases with Proliferation of SBJ ICOs	57
The World's Advertising Network	57
SBJ Ecosystem Support for SBJs	58
Integrating SBJs into Websites and Apps	58
APIs and Documentation	58
Shared Tools for Account Creation, Key Signing, and Wallet Functions	58
Conclusion	58

References	58
Appendix	58
Implementation Notes	58
SBJnaming standards	59
Asset directory standards	59
UI guidelines for SBJnames	60
Operational guidelines for asset directories	60
Asset directory formats	60
Unit Tests	61

Introduction

Smart Media Tokens (SBJs) is a proposal to build a consensus-level token issuance protocol on the SBJblockchain. Inspired by the revolutionary properties of the SBJ token, including automatic distributions to content creators, SBJs will be an upgrade beyond previously created blockchain token issuance protocols due to carefully designed token sale programmability, automated liquidity providers, decentralized token markets and dynamic token distribution parameters, as well as a large ecosystem of tools (open source wallets, shared key signing tools, etc.) for integrations at website and application layers.

SBJs are an evolution of the successful relationship established between SBJand the social websites sitting atop of it, such as SBJit.com, which has grown to be a top 2100 website in Alexa rankings in less than one year, solely from integrating the incentive model of SBJ. With SBJs, any website or content library across the internet may have one or more tokens integrated into its interface to facilitate fundraising and autonomous growth.

These tokens are designed to allow website operators flexibility during the integration of the token into their community by choosing from many parameters that may be structured creatively at outset or refined over time. Any tokens launched as SBJs shall benefit from a blockchain ecosystem built with an inbuilt decentralized exchange, as well as an ecosystem of open-source applications and libraries to support successful deployment, fundraising, and growth.

Leveraging Tokens for Autonomous User Growth

SBJs are a breakthrough for bridging the world’s content applications to tokens in a way that aligns incentives between the users of a network and the entrepreneurs building the applications. By leveraging the concepts of inflation (new token emissions) and token allocations by post-based voting, SBJs exist in a manner where value must be distributed to users who are participating in their related content networks and applications. Entrepreneurs may now create tokens to integrate with their blog, application, or an entire network of applications and topics. With SBJs, the entrepreneurs have the flexibility to decide on the economics of the tokens they integrate into their products, from the inflation rates to the algorithms that distribute the tokens.

Two unique properties align incentives and make SBJs “smart and social” compared to other tokens (such as bitcoin, ether and ERC-20s). The first is a pool of tokens dedicated to incentivizing content creation and curation (called the “rewards pool”). The second is a voting system that leverages the wisdom of the crowd to assess the value of content and distribute tokens to it. These two unique properties when combined are referred to as Proof-of-Brain, which is an entendre based on Proof-of-Work, meant to emphasize the human work required to distribute tokens to community participants. Proof-of-Brain positions SBJs as a tool for building perpetually growing communities, which encourage their members to add value to the community through the built in rewards structure.

Entrepreneurs and established entities may rely on SBJs to grow their content network because of the automated and continuous generation of new tokens that are allocated to producers of content by the holders of the existing tokens, through the process of competitive voting. As the tokens are distributed to users of the network, the interests of

existing token holders are further aligned with content creators, the businesses running the applications, and the entrepreneurs that support them. These unique properties of the tokens' economics continue to provide incentives for new users to join and participate in growing the network. Any application, whether it is an existing publisher behemoth or a stealth-mode social media startup, will be able to integrate and leverage these special tokens for their own growth.

New Fundraising Opportunities

Blockchain-based tokens, beginning strongly with the advent of ERC20 on Ethereum, represent a new manner of bringing capital into an organization through the process of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). ICOs are an opportunity for one group to sell an initial supply of tokens, privately or publicly, for-specific-purpose, for-profit or not-for-profit. Depending on how these tokens are sold, different regulatory bodies could see them as commodities, securities, derivatives, or as none of the above. Regardless, it is clear we have seen north of one billion dollars (USD) raised through ICOs in 2017, and to support this trend, it is possible to conveniently launch and sell tokens via the built in ICO contract of SBJs. The launch of SBJs can be structured for ICOs with hard, soft, and no caps, and can be tailored to receive SBJand cryptocurrencies on other blockchains.

Immediate Liquidity

By leveraging a recently designed automated market maker concept [2], SBJ-based ICOs allow a portion of SBJtokens received to be sent into an SBJ's on-chain, off-order-book market maker in order to provide liquidity to the SBJat a specified reserve ratio. Beyond the social and specialized distribution mechanisms of SBJs, this feature advances the concept of automated market makers by pairing it alongside SBJ's decentralized markets, which also facilitate bids and asks by human participants. The combination of these two markets enables on-chain and trustless exchange opportunities for market makers while enabling liquidity for token users.

Shared Bootstrap Tools

SBJs may be created with [reward pool](#) parameters tuned for "Shared Influence" between SBJPower and other vesting SBJs, which means a SBJcreator may specify that SBJPower can control a portion of the SBJ's rewards pool for an unlimited or limited amount of time, with increasing or decreasing influence. Altogether, Shared Influence may allow SBJs to be wholly or partially bootstrapped by the interest of existing and active SBJor other SBJcommunity members. Through these tools, community managers and entrepreneurs launching a token may leverage existing user bases to accelerate the distribution of the SBJto a target market.

Monetizing with Shared Token Rewards

All SBJbased interfaces have the option of splitting token rewards among a set of arbitrary recipients, which could include an interface, community manager, referrer, a paid position donation pool, and more. An interface can also provide this optionality

of how to split the tokens to the authors. The number of potential Reward Sharing beneficiaries is initially soft capped by block producers at eight while the feature proves its use, however the blockchain is capable of handling up to 256 beneficiaries per post.

Can My Entity Participate in SBJs?

An SBJ can be launched by a person or entity; they only need 1 USD to cover the network fee (this fee prevents spam and unused tokens while accruing value to the network), and a namespace on SBJ- which can be obtained by registering at anon.SBJ.network, SBJit.com, SBJconnect.com, or any other SBJ sign-up service.

Once an account name to register the token with is secured, the account issues the token by using a SBJ-based command line tool or any tool created in the future to support token launches. The token can be structured to support an initial sale or distribution of the token. Certain properties of an SBJ, such as its inflation rate, must also be defined by the person or entity creating the token. These properties dictate how the token is used inside applications and respective communities.

From launch, the token becomes immutable on the blockchain, and leveraged correctly, the token can have dramatic effects on the growth of businesses that choose to integrate these tokens.

Use Cases

We have identified five ways in which existing businesses and future entrepreneurs can leverage specially designed SBJs to transform the internet. Among these use cases you may discover other ways of structuring and leveraging tokens inside applications. This list is by no means exhaustive, and we will update this paper as more use cases demonstrate their value.

1 - Content Publishers - Single Token Support

A mainstream media website's growth has been slowing and they are looking for ways to get ahead of the changing tech landscape. The website migrates to a Disqus-like application based on SBJ, or taps directly into SBJ APIs for a custom integration. Now their subscribers can be rewarded with cryptocurrency while commenting. When the website is ready, they can issue their own token through the comments interface - the token will allow them to 1) raise capital by selling tokens 2) catalyze autonomous growth.




Figure 1: Single Token Content Publishers

2 - Forums - Multiple Token Support

An up-and-coming forum business is looking to integrate cryptocurrency to create cash flow and spark growth to get the business to the next level, however they are not cryptocurrency security experts and would prefer not to host a cryptocurrency wallet. They issue an SBJ and integrate it into their website. Focusing solely on the social aspects, the forum business can integrate other applications, such as SBJConnect into their forum to handle the wallet and transfer capabilities. This allows them to focus on their business (growing communities) without focusing on the security aspects of cryptocurrency. The forum enables additional tokens to be exposed or launched, to represent specific topics of discussion. The ability to launch these tokens can be retained by the company behind the website, or granted to the website's community managers. Tokens dedicated to the website's specific topics will further spur autonomous growth of the website niche by niche. An example of this multi-token model could eventually be found in organizations such as ChainBB (chainbb.com) if it were to enable its own globally available token on its domain,

as well as narrowly available tokens for specific community niches - such as “gardening.”




Figure 2: Multiple tokens Forum

3 - Comments Widget for Online Publishers

One of the ways in which publishers will be onboarded faster to SBJintegrations is by offering a SBJ-based comments widget that can easily be integrated into existing blogs that are built on software such as WordPress and Blogger. The developer employing the widget would be able to take a percentage of the tokens (called “Shared Rewards”) distributed to the commenters for themselves, thereby creating a business opportunity for the next generation of Disqus-like companies that are cryptocurrency enabled. It would alleviate the burdens of transaction signing support, private key management, wallet functionality, and hosting costs for the publisher - by outsourcing all of these functions to the comments widget maintainer.




Figure 3: Comment Widget

4 - Sub-Community Moderators and Managers

Imagine you are a moderator for a specific topic inside a forum, such as a Reddit “sub-reddit” or a SBJit “community”. If a website integrates SBJs for these specific topics, then the topic moderator/s can launch these tokens to empower the subscribers of their topic, raise funds, and increase the quality of content curation for the community.




Figure 4: Sub-community

5 - Arbitrary Assets - Tokens Representing Real World Assets

Let's examine an instance in which an entrepreneur is looking to provide liquidity in the SBJecosystem. The entrepreneur can issue an SBJwithout inflation properties, and imply that they will provide structure to peg it to USD (or any other debt, contract, or asset), making it like an IOU or basic derivative. The structure they provide to the asset includes buying and selling it near \$1, similar to Tether. The entrepreneur sets up bank wire capabilities for buying and selling, and takes a small % on each transaction. The derivative trades against SBJ, and also brings capital into the ecosystem to be used across all tokens.




Figure 5: IOU Asset Token Exchange

Owner's manual

This manual will explain the nuts and bolts of how SBJs work. The intended audience is technical users who want to create their own SBJ.

Create a control account

The first step to creating an SBJ is to create a *control account* for the SBJ. Any SBJ account may serve as a control account, however it is highly recommended to create a dedicated account solely for the purpose. It is also highly recommended that a control account does not post, vote, or hold any SBJ, SBD, or other tokens (other than a small amount of SBJpower for transaction bandwidth).

The control account's name will not occupy a high visibility position in most user interfaces, so it does not much matter if the control account's name is not the best match for the SBJbrand.

Control account security

Security on the control account is important for persons who plan to use the account post launch:

- The control account should use 2-of-3 or 3-of-5 multi-signature security.
- The control account's authorities should have other accounts, not specific keys, as multi-signature members.
- For additional security, each of the accounts in the control account's multi-signature group should itself use multi-signature security.
- A subset of keys should be kept offline, in air-gapped machines.
- Transactions should be generated by an online interface, and physically transferred to the air-gapped machines via removable media.
- Signatures should be returned via physically removable media to the online system for transmission via the UI.

Of course, once authorities are set up, you should verify the account is still able to transact. It is advisable to test your authorities and transaction signing setup using a testnet, or a less-important account on the main network.

Once the token is launched, you may consider burning the account's keys by assigning them to @null, initiating a token for which the dynamic properties can never be adjusted.

Token consensus

Since tokens participate in atomic transactions also involving SBJ, they have been designed as part of the SBJblockchain's consensus.

Token Generation and Initialized Parameters

SBJobject creation

The first operation to be executed is an `SBJ_create_operation`. This operation creates an SBJobject in the blockchain state. After executing the `SBJ_create_operation`, the newly created SBJobject is not yet fully configured.

Most of the configuration occurs in subsequent operations (`SBJ_set_setup_parameters_operation`, `SBJ_setup_inflation_operation` and `SBJ_setup_operation`). These later operations may occur in the same transaction, but they may also occur at any later point in time.

```
struct SBJ_create_operation
{
    account_name_type control_account;
    asset              SBJ_creation_fee;
    asset_symbol_type symbol;
    extensions_type   extensions;
};
```

Numerical asset identifiers

An SBJ is referred to by a *numerical asset identifier* or NAI, consisting of two at-signs followed by nine decimal digits, for example @0314159265. The blockchain enforces that the identifier placed by a UI into the `SBJ_create_operation` must match a result from the `get_nai_pool` RPC. Therefore, an NAI cannot be chosen freely by the SBJcreator. It is not even possible to “mine” a “vanity NAI” (analogous to the “vanity Bitcoin address” some people use).

The reason for this restriction is that the blockchain designers want to discourage users from using the consensus level identifiers as symbol names, and instead use a non-consensus directory system to attach human meaningful symbols to assets. Distinguishing a “namesquatter” from the legitimate owner of a brand is not something that a blockchain can do, especially if the squatter is willing to pay the SBJcreation fee.

SBJnaming

The solution to the namesquatting problem is to publish an *asset directory* mapping NAIs to names. An asset directory is *non-consensus*, meaning that all blockchain operations are serialized only with NAIs. Asset names are only used for UI presentation.

A UI may include an asset directory as a file, URL, or a blockchain account which publishes directory entries with custom operations. The publisher of an asset directory should ensure that directory entries meet whatever standards of legitimate brand ownership the publisher chooses to enforce.

SBJcreation fee

Issuing a `SBJ_create_operation` requires payment of `SBJ_creation_fee`.

The amount required is set by the `SBJ_creation_fee` field of `dynamic_global_properties_object`. This field may contain a value in SBJ or SBD. If `SBJ_creation_fee` is specified in SBD, an equivalent amount of SBJ will be accepted at the current price feed; likewise, if `SBJ_creation_fee` is specified in SBJ, an equivalent amount of SBD will be accepted at the current price feed.

Initially, `SBJ_creation_fee`

will be set to 1 SBD, and no means will be provided to update it. Updates to the `SBJ_creation_fee` amount may occur in future hard-forks, however, so user-agents should read the `SBJ_creation_fee` value from the `dynamic_global_properties_object`. User-agents should not assume the fee will always be 1 SBD and they should be prepared to charge a separate fee paid to the user-agent if the aim of the interface is to enable only a curated set of tokens.

The fee is destroyed by sending it to `SBJ_NULL_ACCOUNT`.

SBJpre-setup

Two pre-setup operations are included: `SBJ_setup_inflation_operation` and `SBJ_setup_parameters`. These operations must be issued after `SBJ_create_operation`, and before `SBJ_setup_operation`. They may be issued in the same transaction, or in prior blocks.

The reason pre-setup operations are not made a part of `SBJ_setup_operation` is to allow a large number of pre-setup operations to be executed over multiple blocks.

SBJsetup

Each SBJ has an associated descriptor object which has *permanent configuration data*. This data cannot be changed after launch! The descriptor is set by the `SBJ_setup_operation`:

```
struct SBJ_setup_operation
{
    account_name_type    control_account;
    asset_symbol_type    SBJ_name;
    int64_t              max_supply = SBJ_MAX_SHARE_SUPPLY;

    SBJ_generation_policy  initial_generation_policy;

    time_point_sec       generation_begin_time;
    time_point_sec       generation_end_time;
    time_point_sec       announced_launch_time;
    time_point_sec       launch_expiration_time;

    extensions_type      extensions;
};
```

The symbol precision in `SBJ_setup_operation` is authoritative. It may differ from, and will override, any previously specified operations' precision. Subsequently issued operations must have matching precision.

The operation must be signed by the `control_account` key. The named SBJ must have been created earlier by the `control_account`. The symbol's embedded decimal places may be distinct from prior `SBJ_setup_operation`.

The `decimal_places` field is used by UIs to display units as a number of decimals.

The `generation_begin_time` is when participants can begin to contribute to the ICO. It is allowed to be in the future so users have time to study the ICO's final terms before the ICO begins.

The `generation_end_time` is when the ICO stops accepting contributions, and the `announced_launch_time` is when the ICO token is created (assuming the ICO reached the minimum participation level). Some pause is allocated between the `generation_end_time` and `announced_launch_time` to allow for the possibility of ICOs that wish to have hidden caps that aren't revealed while the ICO is open for contributions. It also gives the ICO creator time to use the final ICO numbers to aid in pre-launch business activities.

At `launch_expiration_time`, if the ICO has not yet launched, all contributors will be automatically refunded (with virtual operations) and the ICO will be cancelled. The symbol will remain reserved to the specified `control_account`. However, in order to launch the token, an `SBJ_create_operation` must be issued and the `SBJ_creation_fee` must be paid again.

Token units

Initial token generation is driven by a contributions of *SBJunits* from contributors. To simplify rounding concerns, a contribution must be an integer number of SBJ units. The ICO creator sets the size of a SBJunit - it can be large or small. It is better to keep the unit small (for example, 1 SBJ or 0.1 SBJ), as this allows the ICO to be accessible to the maximum possible audience.

A SBJunit also specifies a *routing policy* which determines where the SBJ goes when the token launches. (SBJ for tokens which do not launch may be refunded on demand.) The routing policy may split the SBJ in the unit among multiple parties.

When the ICO occurs, the tokens are generated in *token units*. Multiple token units are generated per SBJunit contributed. Token units also have a routing policy.

The units and their routing policies are specified in the `SBJ_generation_unit` structure:

```
struct SBJ_generation_unit
{
    flat_map< account_name_type, uint16_t >    SBJ_unit;
    flat_map< account_name_type, uint16_t >    token_unit;
};
```

Each (key, value) pair in the `flat_map` determines the routing of some satoshis. The total SBJ/tokens in each unit is simply the sum of the values.

Unit ratios

When an SBJ launches, token units are created for SBJunits in a R-for-1 ratio. The number R is called the *unit ratio*. Maximum and minimum allowable values for R are specified respectively in the `min_unit_ratio` and `max_unit_ratio` fields of `SBJ_generation_policy`.

The maximum number of token units that can be created in the ICO is limited to `max_token_units_generated`, a parameter which is set by the ICO creator. (More tokens can be created after the token has launched, but this later creation is called *inflation* and is not considered to be part of the ICO.)

The unit ratio is set to the largest integer that would not result in exceeding `max_token_units_generated` for the number of SBJunits actually contributed.

Cap and min

ICOs may specify a minimum number of SBJunits `min_SBJ_units`. If the ICO does not reach `min_SBJ_units` before `generation_end_time`, then it does not occur, and contributors become eligible for refunds.

Likewise, ICOs may specify two maximum numbers of SBJunits: A *hard cap* and a *soft cap*. Units in excess of the soft cap have different routing for their SBJ and tokens. SBJunits in excess of the hard cap are rejected and do not generate any SBJs

The effects of the soft cap are divided proportionally among all contributors. I.e. if a ICO has a soft cap of 8 million SBJ, and 10 contributors each contribute 1 million SBJ, then 0.2 million of *each user's* SBJs is routed via the soft cap's policy.

The effects of the hard cap fall solely on the last contributors. I.e. if a ICO has a hard cap of 8 million SBJ, and 10 contributors each contribute 1 million SBJ, then the first 8 users fully participate in the ICO, and the last 2 users are refunded 1 million SBJ.

Hidden caps

The min and hard caps are *hidden* in the generation policy. This means that these numbers are fixed at setup time, but the ICO creator has the option to keep them secret. This functionality is implemented by a *commit/reveal* cryptographic protocol: A hash called the *commitment* is published at setup time, and the actual amount must match the commitment. (A nonce is also included in the hash to prevent an attacker from finding the hidden cap with a brute-force guess-and-test approach.)

The SBJ designer may wish to pre-publish a guarantee that the hidden values are within a certain range. The `lower_bound` and `upper_bound` fields provide this functionality: A revealed amount that is not in the specified range is treated the same as a hash mismatch.

```
struct SBJ_cap_commitment
{
    share_type          lower_bound;
    share_type          upper_bound;
    digest_type         hash;
};

struct SBJ_revealed_cap
{
    share_type          amount;
    uint128_t          nonce;
};

struct SBJ_cap_reveal_operation
{
    account_name_type   control_account;
    SBJ_revealed_cap    cap;

    extensions_type     extensions;
};
```

All caps are hidden, but the cap may be revealed at any point in time. Therefore, an ICO with a non-hidden minimum or cap may be implemented by simply including the `SBJ_cap_reveal_operation` in the same transaction as the `SBJ_setup_operation`. UIs should provide functionality for this.

A UI should provide one or more of the following means to ensure the `nonce` and `amount` are recoverable:

- Force the user to type in the `amount` and `nonce` again, as confirmation they have been backed up.

- Set `nonce` to some deterministic function of the private key and public data, for example `nonce = H(privkey + control_account + lower_bound + upper_bound + current_date)`.
- Provide functionality to brute-force the uncertain fields when the nonce is known (e.g. the current date and `amount`).
- Require the amount to be low-entropy to facilitate brute-forcing when the nonce is known (e.g. a number between 1-999 times a power of 10).

Generation policy data structure

The SBJgeneration policy data structure looks like this:

```
struct SBJ_capped_generation_policy
{
    SBJ_generation_unit pre_soft_cap_unit;
    SBJ_generation_unit post_soft_cap_unit
    ;
    SBJ_cap_commitment min_SBJ_units_commitment;
    SBJ_cap_commitment hard_cap_SBJ_units_commitment;

    uint16_t          soft_cap_percent = 0;

    uint32_t          min_unit_ratio = 0;
    uint32_t          max_unit_ratio = 0;

    extensions_type   extensions;
};
```

Note, the `max_token_units_generated` parameter does not appear anywhere in the operation. The reason is that it is actually a derived parameter: `max_token_units_generated = min_unit_ratio * hard_cap_SBJ_units`.

Additionally, the `SBJ_generation_policy` is defined as a `static_variant`, of which `SBJ_capped_generation_policy` is the only member:

```
typedef static_variant< SBJ_capped_generation_policy > SBJ_generation_policy
;This typedef allows the potential for future protocol versions to allow additional gener-
ation policy semantics with different parameters.
```

Examples and rationale

Example ICO

ALPHA wants to sell a token to the crowd to raise funds where: 70% of contributed SBJgoes to the Alpha Organization Account (`@alpha_org`), 23% of contributed SBJgoes to Founder Account A (`@founder_a`), and 7% of contributed SBJgoes to Founder Account B (`@founder_b`).

ALPHA defines a SBJunit as:

```
SBJ_unit = [{"alpha_org", 70}, {"founder_a", 23}, {"founder_b", 7}]
```

This SBJ-unit contains 100 SBJ-satoshis, or 0.1 SBJ.

For every 1 SBJ contributed, an ALPHA contributor will receive 5 ALPHA tokens, and Founder Account D will receive 1 ALPHA token. This five-sixths / one-sixth split is expressed as:

```
token_unit = [{"$from", 5}, {"founder_c", 1}]
```

This ratio is defined in the following data structure:

```
struct SBJ_generation_unit
{
    flat_map< account_name_type, uint16_t >      SBJ_unit;
    flat_map< account_name_type, uint16_t >      token_unit;
};
```

This token-unit contains 6 ALPHA-satoshis, or 0.0006 ALPHA (if ALPHA has 4 decimal places).

Next we define the *unit ratio* as the relative rate at which `token_unit` are issued as `SBJ_unit` are contributed. So to match the specification of 6 ALPHA per 1 SBJ, we need to issue 1000 ALPHA-units per SBJ-unit. Therefore the unit ratio of this ICO is 1000. This unit ratio is placed in the `min_unit_ratio` and `max_unit_ratio` fields of the `SBJ_capped_generation_policy` data structure:

```
min_unit_ratio = 1000
max_unit_ratio = 1000
```

A special account name, `$from`, represents the contributor. Also supported is `$from.vesting`, which represents the vesting balance of the `$from` account.

Why unit ratios?

Why does the blockchain use unit ratios, rather than simply specifying prices?

The answer is that it is possible to write ICO definitions for which price is ill-defined. For example:

- `"$from"` does not occur in `token_unit`.
- `"$from"` occurs in both `token_unit` and `SBJ_unit`.
- A combination of `"$from"` and `"$from.vesting"` occurs.
- Future expansion allows new special accounts.

All of these ICO definitions have a unit ratio, but defining a single quantity to call “price” is complicated or impossible for ICOs like these.

UI treatment of unit ratios

As a consequence of the above, the concept of “ICO price” is purely a UI-level concept. UIs which provide an ICO price should do the following:

- Document the precise definition of “price” provided by the UI.
- Be well-behaved for pathological input like above.
- Have a button for switching between a unit ratio display and price display.

Hidden cap FAQ

- Q: Should my ICO have a cap?
- A: Some set of people stay away from uncapped ICOs due to perceived “greed”, or want a guaranteed lower bound on the percentage of the ICO their contribution will buy. If you want this set of people to participate, use a cap.
- Q: Should my cap be hidden?
- A: Some people like the transparency and certainty of a public cap. Other people think a hidden cap creates excitement and builds demand. One possible compromise is to publish the previous and next power of 10, for example “this ICO’s cap is between 1 million and 10 million SBJ.”
- Q: How do I disable the cap?
- A: Set it so that the cap would occur above `SBJ_MAX_SHARE_SUPPLY`.

Launch

The *effective launch time* is the time at which tokens become transferable. Two possibilities occur based on the timing of revealing of the hard cap:

- When `min_SBJ_units` and `hard_cap_SBJ_units` are revealed before the `announced_launch_time`, the launch is an *on-time launch*. The launch logic is executed by the blockchain as soon as `announced_launch_time` arrives, regardless of further user action.
- When `min_SBJ_units` and `hard_cap_SBJ_units` have not been revealed before the `announced_launch_time`, the launch will be a *delayed launch*. The launch logic is executed by the blockchain when `min_SBJ_units` and `hard_cap_SBJ_units` have been revealed.
- If the launch is delayed, then any contributor may use `SBJ_refund_operation` to get their SBJback at any time after `announced_launch_time`, and before the launch logic is executed.

The reasons for this design are as follows:

- The hidden cap isn’t published immediately (that’s the definition of *hidden*).
- Publishing the hidden cap is an action that must be done by the ICO creator (again, any action requiring non-public information to occur cannot happen automatically on a blockchain).
- If the ICO creator never acts, then the launch logic will never execute.
- In the case of such a malicious or unresponsive ICO creator, contributors’ SBJ would effectively be trapped forever, and they would never receive any tokens.
- To keep the SBJ from being trapped in this way, the `SBJ_refund_operation` is implemented.

```
struct SBJ_refund_operation
{
    account_name_type    contributor;
    asset                amount;
    extensions_type      extensions;
};
```

Note, users are not *required* to use `SBJ_refund_operation`; each individual contributor must opt-in to receiving a refund. If the ICO creator publicizes a legitimate reason they failed to publish before `announced_launch_time`, it is possible that all/most contributors will voluntarily choose not to use `SBJ_refund_operation`. In this case, the launch will occur as soon as the ICO creator publishes the hidden values.

The launch logic considers a contribution followed by a refund to be equivalent to not having contributed at all. Therefore, when a delayed launch occurs, each contributor will be in *exactly one* of the following two states:

- The contributor has executed `SBJ_refund_operation`, received their SBJback, and will not participate in the ICO.
- The contributor has not been issued a refund, and will participate in the ICO.

It is possible for a delayed launch to have exceeded its `min_SBJ_units` value at the announced launch time, but subsequently falls below its `min_SBJ_units` value as a result of refunds. In such a case, the ICO will not occur; it will be treated as if it had never reached its `min_SBJ_units`.

Full JSON examples

ALPHA

This example builds on the ALPHA example from earlier. This ICO has the following characteristics:

- 70% of contributed SBJ goes to Alpha Organization Account (@alpha_org).
- 23% of contributed SBJ goes to Founder Account A (@founder_a).
- 7% of contributed SBJ goes to Founder Account B (@founder_b).
- Minimum unit of contribution is 0.1 SBJ.
- For every 1 SBJ contributed, the contributor gets 5 ALPHA (@contributor_a).
- For every 1 SBJ contributed, Founder Account C gets 1 ALPHA (@founder_c).
- No minimum, hard cap, or soft cap.
- No post-launch inflation after launch.




Figure 6: Alpha ICO Flow

These are the operations for the ALPHA launch:

```
[
  ["SBJ_setup",
    {
      "control_account" : "alpha",
      "decimal_places" : 4,
      "max_supply" : "1000000000000000",
      "initial_generation_policy" : [0,
        {
          "pre_soft_cap_unit" : {
            "SBJ_unit" : [ ["alpha_org", 70], ["founder_a", 23], ["founder_b", 7] ],
            "token_unit" : [ ["$from", 5], ["founder_c", 1] ]
          },
          "post_soft_cap_unit" : {
            "SBJ_unit" : [ ],
            "token_unit" : [ ]
          },
          "min_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
            "lower_bound" : 1,
            "upper_bound" : 1,
            "hash" : "32edb6022c0921d99aa347e9cda5dc2db413f5574eebaaa8592234308ffebd2b"
          }
        }
      ],
    }
  ],
]
```

```

    "hard_cap_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
      "lower_bound" : "166666666666",
      "upper_bound" : "166666666666",
      "hash" : "93c5a6b892de788c5b54b63b91c4b692e36099b05d3af0d16d01c854723dda21"
    },
    "soft_cap_percent" : 10000,
    "min_unit_ratio" : 1000,
    "max_unit_ratio" : 1000,
    "extensions" : []
  }
],
"generation_begin_time" : "2017-08-10T00:00:00",
"generation_end_time" : "2017-08-17T00:00:00",
"announced_launch_time" : "2017-08-21T00:00:00",
"SBJ_creation_fee" : "1.000 SBD",
"extensions" : []
}
],
["SBJ_cap_reveal"
,{
  "control_account" : "alpha",
  "cap" : { "amount" : 1, "nonce" : "0" },
  "extensions" : []
}
],
["SBJ_cap_reveal"
,{
  "control_account" : "alpha",
  "cap" : { "amount" : "166666666666", "nonce" : "0" },
  "extensions" : []
}
]
]
]

```

Some things to note:

- We disable the soft cap by setting `soft_cap_percent` to `SBJ_100_PERCENT = 10000`.
- `post_soft_cap_unit` must be empty when the soft cap is disabled.
- The unit ratio does not change so `min_unit_ratio / max_unit_ratio` must be set accordingly.
- We disable the hidden caps by using a zero nonce and setting `lower_bound == upper_bound`.
- We still need to reveal the caps with `SBJ_cap_reveal_operation`.
- The hard cap specified is the largest hard cap that does not result in created tokens exceeding `SBJ_MAX_SHARE_SUPPLY`.

BETA

The BETA token is created with the following rules:

- For every 5 SBJcontributed, 3 SBJgo to founder account Fred.

- For every 5 SBJcontributed, 2 SBJgo to founder account George.
- 10% of the initial token supply goes to founder account George.
- 20% of the initial token supply goes to founder account Henry.
- 70% of the initial token supply is divided among contributors according to their contribution.
- Each SBJunit is 0.005 SBJ.
- Each token unit is 0.0010 BETA.
- The minimum raised is 5 million SBJunits, or 25,000 SBJ.
- The maximum raised is 30 million SBJunits, or 150,000 SBJ.
- Each contributor receives 7-14 BETA per SBJcontributed, depending on total contributions.
- George receives 1-2 BETA per SBJcontributed, depending on total contributions.
- Harry receives 2-4 BETA per SBJcontributed, depending on total contributions.
- If the maximum of 30 million SBJunits are raised, then `min_unit_ratio` = 50 applies.
- The maximum number of token units is `min_unit_ratio` times 30 million, or 1.5 billion token units.
- Since each token unit is 0.0010 BETA, at most 1.5 million BETA tokens will be generated.
- If 75,000 SBJor less is contributed, the contributors George and Harry will receive the maximum of 14, 2, and 4 BETA per SBJcontributed (respectively).
- If more than 75,000 SBJis contributed, the contributors, George and Harry will receive BETA in a 70% / 10% / 20% ratio, such that the total is fixed at 1.5 million BETA.
- As a consequence of the hard cap, the contributors, George and Harry will receive at least 7, 1, and 2 BETA per SBJcontributed (respectively).

This example is chosen to demonstrate how the ratios work. It is not a realistic example, as most ICOs will choose to either set `min_unit_ratio` = `max_unit_ratio` like ALPHA, or choose to use a large `max_unit_ratio` like BETA.

```
[
  [
    "SBJ_setup"
  ],
  {
    "control_account" : "beta",
    "decimal_places" : 4,
    "max_supply" : "1000000000000000",
    "initial_generation_policy" : [0,
      {
        "pre_soft_cap_unit" : {
          "SBJ_unit" : [ ["fred", 3], ["george", 2] ],
          "token_unit" : [ ["$from", 7], ["george", 1], ["henry", 2] ]
        },
        "post_soft_cap_unit" : {
          "SBJ_unit" : [ ],
          "token_unit" : [ ]
        }
      }
    ],
    "min_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
      "lower_bound" : 5000000,
      "upper_bound" : 5000000,
    }
  }
]
```



```

    "hash" : "dff2e4aed5cd054439e045e1216722aa8c4758b22df0a4b0251d6f16d58e0f3b"
  },
  "hard_cap_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
    "lower_bound" : 30000000,
    "upper_bound" : 30000000,
    "hash" : "f8e6ab0e8f2c06a9d94881fdf370f0849b4c7864f62242040c88ac82ce5e40d6"
  },
  "soft_cap_percent" : 10000,
  "min_unit_ratio" : 50,
  "max_unit_ratio" : 100,
  "extensions" : []
}
],
"generation_begin_time" : "2017-06-01T00:00:00",
"generation_end_time" : "2017-06-30T00:00:00",
"announced_launch_time" : "2017-07-01T00:00:00",
"SBJ_creation_fee" : "1000.000 SBD",
"extensions" : []
}
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal"
  ,{
    "control_account" : "beta",
    "cap" : { "amount" : 5000000, "nonce" : "0" },
    "extensions" : []
  }
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal"
  ,{
    "control_account" : "beta",
    "cap" : { "amount" : 30000000, "nonce" : "0" },
    "extensions" : []
  }
]
]
]

```

[This spreadsheet](#) will make the relationship clear.

GAMMA

The GAMMA token is like BETA, but with one difference: The large `max_unit_ratio` means that the maximum issue of 1.5 million tokens is reached very early in the ICO. This ICO effectively divides 1.5 million GAMMA tokens between contributors (provided at least 5 SBJs contributed).

```

[
  [
    "SBJ_setup"
    ,{

```

```

"control_account" : "gamma",
"decimal_places" : 4,
"max_supply" : "1000000000000000",
"initial_generation_policy" : [0,
{
  "pre_soft_cap_unit" : {
    "SBJ_unit" : [["fred", 3], ["george", 2]],
    "token_unit" : [["$from", 7], ["george", 1], ["henry", 2]]
  },
  "post_soft_cap_unit" : {
    "SBJ_unit" : [],
    "token_unit" : []
  },
  "min_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
    "lower_bound" : 5000000,
    "upper_bound" : 5000000,
    "hash" : "dff2e4aed5cd054439e045e1216722aa8c4758b22df0a4b0251d6f16d58e0f3b"
  },
  "hard_cap_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
    "lower_bound" : 30000000,
    "upper_bound" : 30000000,
    "hash" : "f8e6ab0e8f2c06a9d94881fdf370f0849b4c7864f62242040c88ac82ce5e40d6"
  },
  "soft_cap_percent" : 10000,
  "min_unit_ratio" : 50,
  "max_unit_ratio" : 300000,
  "extensions" : []
}
],
"generation_begin_time" : "2017-06-01T00:00:00",
"generation_end_time" : "2017-06-30T00:00:00",
"announced_launch_time" : "2017-07-01T00:00:00",
"SBJ_creation_fee" : "1000.000 SBD",
"extensions" : []
}
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal"
  ,{
    "control_account" : "gamma",
    "cap" : { "amount" : 5000000, "nonce" : "0" },
    "extensions" : []
  }
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal"
  ,{
    "control_account" : "gamma",
    "cap" : { "amount" : 30000000, "nonce" : "0" },
    "extensions" : []
  }
]

```

```
]
]
```

DELTA

In this ICO we have one million DELTA tokens created for the founder, and none for contributors. A modest contribution of 0.1 SBJ can be made by any user (including the founder themselves) to trigger the generation.

```
[
  [
    "SBJ_setup"
  ],
  {
    "control_account" : "delta",
    "decimal_places" : 5,
    "max_supply" : "1000000000000000",
    "initial_generation_policy" : [0,
      {
        "pre_soft_cap_unit" : {
          "SBJ_unit" : [ ["founder", 1] ],
          "token_unit" : [ ["founder", 10000] ]
        },
        "post_soft_cap_unit" : {
          "SBJ_unit" : [ ],
          "token_unit" : [ ]
        },
        "min_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
          "lower_bound" : 10000000,
          "upper_bound" : 10000000,
          "hash" : "4e12522945b8cc2d87d54debd9563a1bb6461f1b1fa1c31876afe3514e9a1511"
        },
        "hard_cap_SBJ_units_commitment" : {
          "lower_bound" : 10000000,
          "upper_bound" : 10000000,
          "hash" : "4e12522945b8cc2d87d54debd9563a1bb6461f1b1fa1c31876afe3514e9a1511"
        },
        "soft_cap_percent" : 10000,
        "min_unit_ratio" : 1000,
        "max_unit_ratio" : 1000,
        "extensions" : [ ]
      }
    ],
    "generation_begin_time" : "2017-06-01T00:00:00",
    "generation_end_time" : "2017-06-30T00:00:00",
    "announced_launch_time" : "2017-07-01T00:00:00",
    "SBJ_creation_fee" : "1000.000 SBD",
    "extensions" : [ ]
  }
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal",
```

```

{
  "control_account" : "delta",
  "cap" : { "amount" : 10000000, "nonce" : "0" },
  "extensions" : []
}
],
[
  "SBJ_cap_reveal"
, {
  "control_account" : "delta",
  "cap" : { "amount" : 10000000, "nonce" : "0" },
  "extensions" : []
}
]
]

```

Vesting contributions

It is possible to send part or all of contributions to a vesting balance, instead of permitting immediate liquidity. This example puts 95% in vesting.

```
"token_unit" : [["$from.vesting", 95], ["$from", 5]]
```

Burning contributed SBJ

In this ICO, the SBJ is permanently destroyed rather than going into the wallet of any person. This mimics the structure of the Counterparty ICO.

```

{
  "SBJ_unit" : [["null", 1]],
  "token_unit" : [["$from", 1]]
}

```

Vesting as cost

In this ICO, you don't send SBJ to the issuer in exchange for tokens. Instead, you vest SBJ (to yourself), and tokens are issued to you equal to the SBJ you vested.

```

{
  "SBJ_unit" : [["$from.vesting", 1]],
  "token_unit" : [["$from", 1]]
}

```

Non-SBJ & Hybrid ICO's

ICOs using non-SBJ contributions – for example, SBD, BTC, ETH, etc. – cannot be done fully automatically on-chain. However, such ICOs can be managed by manually transferring some founder account's distribution to buyers' SBJ accounts in proportion to their non-SBJ contribution.

Inflation Parameters

Creation of SBJ after launch is called *inflation*.

Inflation is the means by which the SBJ rewards contributors for the value they provide.

Inflation events use the following data structure:

```
struct SBJ_inflation_unit
{
    flat_map< account_name_type, uint16_t >    token_unit;
};

// Event: Support issuing tokens to target at time
struct token_inflation_event
{
    timestamp            schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit  unit;
    uint32_t            num_units;
};
```

This event prints `num_units` units of the SBJ token.

Possible inflation target

The target is the entity to which the inflation is directed. The target may be a normal SBJ account controlled by an individual founder, or a multi-signature secured account comprised of several founders.

In addition, several special targets are possible representing trustless functions provided by the blockchain itself:

- Rewards. A special destination representing the token's posting / voting rewards.
- Vesting. A special destination representing the tokens backing vested tokens.

Event sequences

Traditionally blockchains compute inflation on a per-block basis, as block production rewards are the main (often, only) means of inflation.

However, there is no good reason to couple inflation to block production for SBJs. In fact, SBJs have no block rewards, since they have no blocks (the underlying functionality of block production being supplied by the SBJ witnesses, who are rewarded with SBJ).

Repeating inflation at regular intervals can be enabled by adding `interval_seconds` and `interval_count` to the `token_inflation_event` data structure. The result is a new data structure called `token_inflation_event_seq_v1`:

```
// Event seq v1: Support repeatedly issuing tokens to target at time
struct token_inflation_event_seq_v1
{
    timestamp            schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit  unit;
    asset               new_SBJ;
};
```

```

    int32_t          interval_seconds;
    uint32_t         interval_count;
};

```

The data structure represents a token inflation event that repeats every `interval_seconds` seconds, for `interval_count` times. The maximum integer value `0xFFFFFFFF` is a special sentinel value that represents an event sequence that repeats forever.

Note, the `new_SBJ` is a quantity of SBJ, not a number of units. The number of units is determined by dividing `new_SBJ` by the sum of `unit` members.

Adding relative inflation

Often, inflation schedules are expressed using percentage of supply, rather than in absolute terms:

```

// Event seq v2: v1 + allow relative amount of tokens
struct token_inflation_event_seq_v2
{
    timestamp          schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit unit;
    uint32_t           num_units;

    int32_t            interval_seconds;
    uint32_t           interval_count;

    asset              abs_amount;
    uint32_t           rel_amount_numerator;
};

```

Then we compute `new_SBJ` as follows from the supply:

```

rel_amount = (SBJ_supply * rel_amount_numerator) / SBJ_REL_AMOUNT_DENOMINATOR
;new_SBJ= max( abs_amount, rel_amount );

```

If we set `SBJ_REL_AMOUNT_DENOMINATOR` to a power of two, the division can be optimized to a bit-shift operation. To gain a more dynamic range from the bits, we can let the shift be variable:

```

// Event seq v3: v2 + specify shift in struct
struct token_inflation_event_seq_v3
{
    timestamp          schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit unit;

    int32_t            interval_seconds;
    uint32_t           interval_count;

    asset              abs_amount;
    uint32_t           rel_amount_numerator;
    uint8_t            rel_amount_denom_bits;
};

```

Then the computation becomes:

```
rel_amount = (SBJ_supply * rel_amount_numerator) >> rel_amount_denom_bits
;new_SBJ= max( abs_amount, rel_amount );
```

Of course, the implementation of these computations must carefully handle potential overflow in the intermediate value `SBJ_supply * rel_amount_numerator`!

Adding time modulation

Time modulation allows implementing an inflation rate which changes continuously over time according to a piecewise linear function. This can be achieved by simply specifying the left/right endpoints of a time interval, and specifying absolute amounts at both endpoints:

```
// Event seq v4: v3 + modulation over time
struct token_inflation_event_seq_v4
{
    timestamp          schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit unit;

    int32_t            interval_seconds;
    uint32_t           interval_count;

    timestamp          lep_time;
    timestamp          rep_time;

    asset              lep_abs_amount;
    asset              rep_abs_amount;
    uint32_t           lep_rel_amount_numerator;
    uint32_t           rep_rel_amount_numerator;

    uint8_t            rel_amount_denom_bits;
};
```

Some notes about this:

- Only the numerator of relative amounts is interpolated, the denominator is the same for both endpoints.
- For times before the left endpoint time, the amount at the left endpoint time is used.
- For times after the right endpoint time, the amount at the right endpoint time is used.

Code looks something like this:

```
if( now <= lep_time )
{
    abs_amount = lep_abs_amount;
    rel_amount_numerator = lep_rel_amount_numerator;
}
else if( now >= rep_time )
{
    abs_amount = rep_abs_amount;
    rel_amount_numerator = rep_rel_amount_numerator;
}
```

```

}
else
{
    // t is a number between 0.0 and 1.0
    // this calculation will need to be implemented
    // slightly re-arranged so it uses all integer math

    t = (now - lep_time) / (rep_time - lep_time)
    abs_amount = lep_abs_amount * (1-t) + rep_abs_amount * t;
    rel_amount_numerator = lep_rel_amount_numerator * (1-t) + rep_rel_amount_numerator * t;
}

```

Inflation operations

The inflation operation is specified as follows:

```

struct SBJ_setup_inflation_operation
{
    account_name_type    control_account;

    timestamp            schedule_time;
    SBJ_inflation_unit  inflation_unit;

    int32_t              interval_seconds = 0;
    uint32_t             interval_count = 0;

    timestamp            lep_time;
    timestamp            rep_time;

    asset               lep_abs_amount;
    asset               rep_abs_amount;
    uint32_t            lep_rel_amount_numerator = 0;
    uint32_t            rep_rel_amount_numerator = 0;

    uint8_t             rel_amount_denom_bits = 0;

    extensions_type     extensions
};

```

The `setup_inflation_operation` is a *pre-setup* operation which must be executed *before* the `SBJ_setup_operation`. See the section on pre-setup operations.

Inflation FAQ

- Q: Can the SBJinflation data structures express SBJ's [current inflation scheme](#)?
- A: Yes (except for rounding errors).
- Q: Can the SBJinflation data structures reward founders directly after X months/years?
- A: Yes.
- Q: I don't care about time modulation. Can I disable it?

- A: Yes, just set the `lep_abs_amount == rep_abs_amount` and `lep_rel_amount_numerator == rep_rel_amount_numerator` to the same value, and set `lep_time = rep_time` (any value will do).
- Q: Can some of this complexity be hidden by a well-designed UI?
- A: Yes.
- Q: Can we model the inflation as a function of time with complete accuracy?
- A: The inflation data structures can be fully modeled / simulated. For some issue structures, the amount issued depends on how much is raised, so the issue structures cannot be modeled with complete accuracy.

Named token parameters

Some behaviors of SBJare influenced by compile-time configuration constants which are implemented by `#define` statements in the SBJd C++ source code. It makes sense for the equivalent behaviors for SBJs to be configurable by the SBJcreator.

These parameters are `runtime_parameters` and `setup_parameters`. The `setup_parameters` are a field in `SBJ_setup_operation`; they must be set before `SBJ_setup_operation`, and cannot be changed once `SBJ_setup_operation` is executed. The `runtime_parameters` are a field in `SBJ_set_runtime_parameters_operation`, and they can be changed by the token creator at any time.

These operations are defined as follows:

```
struct SBJ_set_setup_parameters_operation
{
    account_name_type                control_account;

    flat_set< SBJ_setup_parameter
>extensions_type                    setup_parameters;
                                     extensions;
};

struct SBJ_set_runtime_parameters_operation
{
    account_name_type                control_account;

    flat_set< SBJ_runtime_parameter
>extensions_type                    runtime_parameters;
                                     extensions;
};
```

Currently the following `setup_parameters` and `runtime_parameters` are defined:

```
struct SBJ_param_allow_vesting        { bool value = true; };
struct SBJ_param_allow_voting        { bool value = true; };

typedef static_variant<
    SBJ_param_allow_vesting
    , SBJ_param_allow_voting
    > SBJ_setup_parameter;

struct SBJ_param_windows_v1
{
```

```

uint32_t cashout_window_seconds = 0;           // SBJ_CASHOUT_WINDOW_SECONDS
uint32_t reverse_auction_window_seconds = 0;   // SBJ_REVERSE_AUCTION_WINDOW_SECONDS
};

struct SBJ_param_vote_regeneration_period_seconds_v1
{
    uint32_t vote_regeneration_period_seconds = 0; // SBJ_VOTE_REGENERATION_SECONDS
    uint32_t votes_per_regeneration_period = 0;
};

struct SBJ_param_rewards_v1
{
    uint128_t          content_constant = 0;
    uint16_t           percent_curation_rewards = 0;
    uint16_t           percent_content_rewards = 0;
    curve_id           author_reward_curve;
    curve_id           curation_reward_curve;
};

struct SBJ_param_allow_downvotes
{
    bool value = true;
};

typedef static_variant<
    SBJ_param_windows_v1,
    SBJ_param_vote_regeneration_period_seconds_v1
    , SBJ_param_rewards_v1,
    SBJ_param_allow_downvotes
    > SBJ_runtime_parameter;

```

UIs which allow inspecting or setting these parameters should be aware of the type and scale of each parameter. In particular, percentage parameters are on a basis point scale (i.e. 100% corresponds to a value of `SBJ_100_PERCENT = 10000`), and UIs or other tools for creating or inspecting transactions *must* use the basis point scale.

Parameter constraints

Several dynamic parameters must be constrained to prevent abuse scenarios that could harm token users.

- $0 < \text{vote_regeneration_seconds} < \text{SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVAL_SECONDS}$
- $0 \leq \text{reverse_auction_window_seconds} + \text{SBJ_UPVOTE_LOCKOUT} < \text{cashout_window_seconds}$
 $< \text{SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVAL_SECONDS}$

SBJvesting semantics

SBJs have similar vesting (powerup / powerdown) semantics to SBJ. In particular:

- SBJs can be “powered up” into a vesting balance.

- SBJs in a vesting balance can be “powered down” over 13 weeks (controlled by static SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVALS, SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVAL_SECONDS parameters).
- Voting is affected only by powered-up tokens.
- Vesting balance cannot be transferred or sold.

Additionally, some token inflation may be directed to vesting balances. These newly “printed” tokens are effectively split among all users with vesting balances, proportional to the number of tokens they have vested. As the number of tokens printed is independent of users’ vesting balances, the percentage rate of return this represents will vary depending on how many tokens are vested at a time.

Content rewards

Tokens flow from SBJemissions into the reward fund. The blockchain uses algorithms to decide:

- (1) How to divide the token-wide rewards among posts.
- (2) How to divide rewards within a post among the author and curators (upvoters) of that post.

The algorithms to solve these problems operate as follows:

- (1) Posts are weighed *against other posts* according to the *reward curve* or *rc*.
- (2a) The curators collectively receive a fixed percentage of the post, specified by the *curation_pct* parameter.
- (2b) The author receives the remainder (after applying any beneficiaries or limited/declined author reward).
- (2c) Curators are weighted *against other curators of that post* according to the *curation curve* or *cc*.




Figure 7: Flow of initial tokens and SBJemissions

Curve definitions

The reward curve can be *linear* or *quadratic*. The linear reward curve $rc(r) = r$ passes the R-shares (upvotes) through unchanged. The quadratic reward curve $rc(r) = r^2 + 2rs$ has increasing slope.

For an illustration of the meaning of reward curves, imagine grouping the most-upvoted posts as follows:

- Section A consists of the top 10% of posts by upvotes.
- Section B consists of the next 10% of posts by upvotes.

Here's how the rewards differ:

- With either reward curve, Section A posts will have greater rewards than Section B posts, since they have more upvotes.
- With the quadratic reward curve, Section A posts will have an *additional boost* relative to Section B posts, since Section A posts will get *more rewards per upvote*.
- With the linear reward curve, Section A and Section B will get the same reward per upvote.

Possible curation curves are:

- Linear $cc(r) = r$
- Square-root $cc(r) = \sqrt{r}$
- Bounded $cc(r) = r / (r + 2s)$

To help visualize, here are some plots called *pie charts*. Each colored area represents how curation rewards are divided among curators with equal voting power.




Figure 8: Reward curves and curation curves

- The rectangular vertical column shows the immediate reward upon making an upvote.
- The colored area extending to the right shows how the rewards of a curator grow as later curators vote.
- When both curves are linear, everyone gets the same curation reward regardless of

which post they vote on.

- In the case of `rc_linear + cc_sqrt` and `rc_quadratic + cc_bounded`, the same height rectangles means everyone gets about the same initial curation reward, call this ICR=.
- In the case of `rc_linear + cc_bounded`, the rectangles are decreasing in height. This represents a progressive *handicap* against voting for already-popular posts, call this ICR-.
- In the case of `rc_quadratic + cc_sqrt` and `rc_quadratic + cc_linear`, the rectangles are increasing in height. Call this ICR+.

Fundamentally, curation is making a prediction that upvotes will occur in the future. As reward system designers, our criterion for selecting a curve should be to reward successful predictions. Which curve satisfies this criterion depends on the relationship between current and future upvotes.

- If a post's future upvotes are *independent* of its current upvotes, we should choose an ICR= curve.
- If a post's future upvotes are *positively correlated* with its current upvotes, we should choose some ICR- curve, ideally somehow tuned to the amount of correlation.
- If a post's future upvotes are *negatively correlated* with its current upvotes, we should choose some ICR+ curve, ideally somehow tuned to the amount of correlation.

In practice, independence or a modest positive correlation should be expected, so an ICR= or ICR- curve should be chosen. For SBJitself, curation was originally the quadratic ICR=, as of the SBJhard fork 19 it is the linear ICR=.

Target votes per day

Each account has a `voting_power`, which is essentially a “mana bar” that fills from 0% to 100% over time at a constant rate. That rate is determined by two parameters:

- (a) The time it takes to regenerate the bar to 100%, `vote_regeneration_period_seconds`.
- (b) The `voting_power` used by a maximum-strength vote.

The `vote_regeneration_period_seconds` is specified directly. For (b), instead of specifying the voting power of a maximum-strength vote directly, instead you specify `votes_per_regeneration_period`. Then the maximum-strength vote is set such that a user casting that many max-strength votes will exactly cancel the regeneration.

SBJSetup GUI Sketch

Steem SMT Setup

Create your own token

Step 1: Token details

Token symbol [?]	Content rewards curve [?]
<input type="text" value="FASHN"/>	<input type="text" value="Linear"/>
What is the maximum total supply of tokens to be created?	Curation rewards curve [?]
<input type="text" value="100,000,000"/>	<input type="text" value="Bounded"/>
Emissions rate [?]	Do you want to raise funds via an ICO?
<input type="text" value="5%"/> <input type="text" value="Yearly"/>	<input type="text" value="Yes"/>

Step 2: Fundraising details

ICO starting date	What is the maximum amount to raise?
<input type="text" value="22 November 2017"/>	<input type="text" value="10,000,000 STEEM"/>
ICO closing date	Who should receive the funds from the ICO?
<input type="text" value="22 December 2017"/>	<input type="text" value="90%"/> <input type="text" value="@fashn_org"/>
What is the minimum amount to raise?	<input type="text" value="5%"/> <input type="text" value="@founder_a"/>
<input type="text" value="3,000,000 STEEM"/>	<input type="text" value="5%"/> <input type="text" value="@founder_b"/>

Step 3: Dynamic properties

Figure 9: SBJConfiguration

Votability and Rewardability

In this section, we introduce the concepts of *votability* and *rewardability*.

- A token is *votable* for a comment if the balance of that token influences the comment.
- For a given vote, each votable token of the comment is either *rewardable* or *advisory*.
- If a token is rewardable, then the vote affects the comment's reward in that token.
- If a token is advisory, then the vote does not affect the comment's reward in that token.

Advisory votes do not affect rewards or voting power. However, the ranking algorithms and estimated reward calculations still apply advisory votes, so UIs may display advisory posts accordingly.

The votable token set is determined by `allowed_vote_assets` which is a `comment_options_extension`.

```
struct allowed_vote_assets
{
    flat_map< asset_symbol_type, votable_asset_info >    votable_assets;
};

struct votable_asset_info_v1
{
    share_type          max_accepted_payout    = 0;
    bool                allow_curation_rewards = false;
};

typedef static_variant< votable_asset_info_v1 >    votable_asset_info;
```

The following rules are applied to determine whether tokens are votable:

- SBJ is votable for every post.
- A token is votable for a post if it appears in the post's `votable_assets`.
- Otherwise, the token is not votable for this post.

And these are the rules for whether a token is rewardable:

- In order to be rewardable for a post, a token must be votable for that post.
- If, for some post/token, that post's `max_accepted_payout` of the token is zero, then the token is not rewardable for that post.
- If some voter (i.e. upvoter / downvoter) has a zero balance of a token, then that token is not rewardable for that voter's votes.
- If the `max_accepted_payout` for any non-SBJ token is nonzero, then the `max_accepted_payout` for SBJ/SBD must be at least the default `max_accepted_payout`.

Implementation notes:

- For an advisory vote, all rewards are zero, including curators and beneficiaries. This is because the blockchain applies the `max_accepted_payout` cap before the curator / beneficiary computations.

- Currently (as of SBJhard fork 19), the SBJblockchain *does* deduct voting power for advisory SBJvotes. This behavior will be changed in a future SBJ hard fork (SBJissue #1380).
- At most two tokens may be specified in `votable_assets`. This means that each post is voted with at most three tokens (including SBJ).
- The default `max_accepted_payout` is stored in `max_accepted_SBJ_payout_latch` member of `dynamic_global_properties_object`. Clients should populate `max_accepted_payout` of a post based on this member, in case the default value changes in a future version.

No consensus level restriction forces any particular post to have any particular `allowed_vote_assets`. As a consequence, any post may mark itself as eligible to be rewarded in any token. However, UI's may impose their own non-consensus validation rules on `allowed_vote_assets`, and hide posts that violate these non-consensus validation rules.

For example, in a Hivemind community with a corresponding token, there may be a validation rule that the `allowed_vote_assets` specified in each post within that Hivemind community must include the token of that community. This is a non-consensus validation rule, since the entire concept of a post existing within a Hivemind community is a non-consensus concept. Since it is a non-consensus validation rule, no consensus logic can enforce it. However, UIs that are aware of Hivemind communities may refuse to index or display posts that violate this validation rule.

Static Token Parameters

Static parameters are configuration constants that affect the behavior of SBJs, but are deliberately excluded from `SBJ_setup_parameters` or `SBJ_runtime_parameters`. The reason they are designed to be non-configurable is that allowing these parameters to significantly deviate from the values used for SBJ would result in significant risks, such as:

- May result in a very complicated implementation.
- May result in extreme end-user frustration.
- May threaten the security and stability of the token.
- May threaten the security and stability of SBJ.

Here is the list of such static parameters:

- `SBJ_UPVOTE_LOCKOUT_HF17` : Static – This value locks out upvotes from posts at a certain time prior to “CASH OUT”, to prevent downvote abuse immediately prior to “CASH OUT.”
- `SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVALS` : Static
- `SBJ_VESTING_WITHDRAW_INTERVAL_SECONDS` : Static
- `SBJ_MAX_WITHDRAW_ROUTES` : Static
- `SBJ_SAVINGS_WITHDRAW_TIME` : Static
- `SBJ_SAVINGS_WITHDRAW_REQUEST_LIMIT` : Static
- `SBJ_MAX_VOTE_CHANGES` : Static
- `SBJ_MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_SEC` : Static
- `SBJ_MIN_ROOT_COMMENT_INTERVAL` : Static
- `SBJ_MIN_REPLY_INTERVAL` : Static
- `SBJ_MAX_COMMENT_DEPTH` : Static

- SBJ_SOFT_MAX_COMMENT_DEPTH : Static
- SBJ_MIN_PERMLINK_LENGTH : Static
- SBJ_MAX_PERMLINK_LENGTH : Static

Mandatory token parameters

The token parameters set by `SBJ_setup_parameters` or `SBJ_runtime_parameters` have default values. A few SBJ-equivalent parameters are specified by `SBJ_setup_operation` fields. These are the parameters which do not have a default value, and thus, must be specified for every asset.

- SBJ_MAX_SHARE_SUPPLY : Set by `SBJ_setup_operation.max_supply`
- SBJ_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION : Set by `pow(10, SBJ_setup_operation.decimal_places)`
- SBJ_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION_DIGITS : Set by `SBJ_setup_operation.decimal_places`

SBJinteraction with existing operations

- `comment_payout_beneficiaries` : The existing `comment_payout_beneficiaries` will only redirect SBJ. In the future, `comment_payout_beneficiaries` functionality which allows redirecting SBJrewards may be added.
- `comment_options` : `max_accepted_payout`, `allow_votes` only affects SBJ, see [here](#) to restrict `max_accepted_payout` for assets. `allow_curation_rewards` affects all tokens.
- `vote_operation` : Multiple tokens in the comment’s votable set vote.
- `transfer_operation` : Supports all SBJs.
- Escrow operations: Do not support SBJs.
- `transfer_to_vesting_operation` : Supports all SBJs that support vesting.
- `withdraw_vesting_operation` : Supports all SBJs that support vesting.
- `set_withdraw_vesting_route_operation` : Does not support SBJs.
- `account_witness_vote_operation` : SBJs do not affect witness votes.
- `account_witness_proxy_operation` : SBJs do not affect witness votes.
- `feed_publish_operation` : Feeds may not be published for SBJs.
- `convert_operation` : SBJs cannot be converted.
- Limit order operations : Limit orders are fully supported by SBJs trading against SBJ.
- `transfer_to_savings_operation` : SBJs support savings.
- `decline_voting_rights_operation` : Affects SBJvotes as well as SBJvotes.
- `claim_reward_balance_operation` : Restrictions on this operation are relaxed to allow any asset in any of the three fields, including SBJs.
- `delegate_vesting_shares_operation` : Supports all SBJs that support vesting.
- Multisig Native: There is nothing “special” about the handling of SBJoperations signed by multiple signatures. If you set up your account to require multi-signature security, then everything your account signs will need to be signed with multiple signatures, as you specified. This includes operations your account does as a control account managing an SBJ, and operations your account does as a user holding SBJ tokens.

Automated Market Makers for SBJs

Automated Market Makers are smart contracts, largely based on the [Bancor Protocol \[2\]](#), that may be constructed during the initial ICO setup of an SBJ for providing perpetual liquidity to an SBJ community. For simplicity, Automated Market Makers in SBJ may only trade between SBJ and any given SBJ.

Setup

Basic Definitions

In this article, we'll let s represent a quantity of SBJ, let t represent a quantity of some token (SBJ), and let p represent a price, such that pt is SBJ-valued (i.e. if MYTOKEN is trading at $p = 0.05$ SBJ/ MYTOKEN then $t = 120$ MYTOKEN has a value of $pt = (0.05 \text{ SBJ/ MYTOKEN}) \cdot (120 \text{ MYTOKEN}) = 6 \text{ SBJ}$).

Suppose we have a market maker (or any economic agent) with a two-asset “portfolio” (inventory) of s SBJ and t tokens. If the price of tokens is t , then we may measure the value of this portfolio, in units of SBJ, as $v(p, s, t) = s + pt$.

One common portfolio management policy is to require that SBJ should be some constant fraction r of the portfolio, i.e. $s = rv(p, s, t)$ where $0 < r < 1$. We call this policy the *constant portfolio ratio* or CPR policy, and the equation $s = rv(p, s, t)$ is the *CPR invariant*.

A different portfolio management policy, discussed by the Bancor whitepaper, is called CRR or *constant reserve ratio*. To discuss CRR, let us notate the total number of tokens in existence as T . The *CRR invariant* is then defined as $s = rv(p, 0, T - t)$.

Notes on Conventions

We must discuss where our convention varies from the Bancor whitepaper. At some times, when some user Alice interacts with the market maker, Alice will remove some tokens from her balance to get SBJ from the market maker's balance. On the other hand, Bob may add some tokens to his balance in exchange for sending SBJ to the market maker's balance.

Bancor takes the convention that in this example, the market maker *destroys* tokens in its interaction with Alice, and *creates* tokens in its interaction with Bob. The Bancor convention suggests the market maker is not an ordinary actor, but needs system-level “special powers” – specifically, the privilege to operate the token printing press – in order to function.

In this paper, we adopt the convention that the tokens sent by Alice to the market maker are not destroyed, but are instead added to the inventory (balance) of the market maker. Likewise, the tokens sent to Bob by the market maker are not created out of thin air; they already exist and are merely transferred from the inventory of the market maker to Bob. Thus, we show that the market maker is essentially an ordinary economic agent acting according to a deterministic algorithm – it doesn't actually need “special powers”!

Finite Trades

Basic Definitions

A *trade* is a change in the market maker's balance from $(s, t) \rightarrow (s + \Delta s, t + \Delta t)$. The *price* at which the trade occurs is defined as $p = \frac{-\Delta s}{\Delta t}$. We restrict ourselves to *well-formed trades* where either $\Delta s = \Delta t = 0$, or Δs and Δt are both nonzero and have opposite sign.

Theorem: A trade at price p conserves value at price p . More rigorously, if $\Delta s, \Delta t$ represent a trade at price p , then $v(p, s, t) = v(p, s + \Delta s, t + \Delta t)$.

Let us more rigorously define the market maker's *state* as a tuple $M = (s, t, T, r)$. Given some price p , we may define the *restoring trade* at p (also called a *relaxing trade* or a *relaxation*) to be a trade which occurs at price p and results in a state that satisfies the CRR invariant.

Computing the Restoring Trade

The restoring trade consists of functions $\Delta s(M, p)$ and $\Delta t(M, p)$. We may actually compute these functions from the definition of price and the CRR invariant:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta s &= -p\Delta t \\ s + \Delta s &= rv(p, 0, T - (t + \Delta t)) \\ \Rightarrow s - p\Delta t &= rv(p, 0, T - t - \Delta t) \\ &= rp(T - t - \Delta t) \\ &= rpT - rpt - rp\Delta t \\ \Rightarrow rp\Delta t - p\Delta t &= rp(T - t) - s \\ \Rightarrow \Delta t &= \frac{rp(T - t) - s}{rp - p} \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{1 - r}\right) \left(\frac{s}{p} - r(T - t)\right) \\ \Rightarrow \Delta s &= -p\Delta t \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{1 - r}\right) (rp(T - t) - s)\end{aligned}$$

Computing the Equilibrium Price

Given a state M , there exists some price $p_{eq}(M)$ for which the restoring trade is zero; call this price the *equilibrium price*. We may compute the equilibrium price by setting $\Delta s = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta s &= 0 \\
&= \left(\frac{1}{1-r} \right) (rp_{eq}(T-t) - s) \\
\Rightarrow rp_{eq}(T-t) - s &= 0 \\
\Rightarrow rp_{eq}(T-t) &= s \\
\Rightarrow p_{eq} &= \frac{s}{r(T-t)}
\end{aligned}$$

Theorem: Relaxation is idempotent. That is, after relaxing at price p , the equilibrium price of the resulting state is p , and a second relaxation at price p will be a zero trade.

Example

Example: Suppose $M = (1200, 3600, 12000, 0.25)$ and $p = 0.5$. Then of the $T = 12000$ TOKEN in existence, $t = 3600$ TOKEN is held by the MM, so $T-t = 12000-3600 = 8400$ TOKEN are “circulating” (i.e. exist in balances outside the MM). These circulating tokens are worth $p(T-t) = 4200$ SBJtotal, so they “should be” backed by a target reserve level of $rp(T-t) = 4200 * 0.25 = 1050$ SBJ.

In this example, there is “too much” SBJin the reserve, so relaxation will buy tokens in the market. This sale will cause two effects: It will decrease the reserve SBJ, and also decrease circulating tokens. The decrease in circulating tokens, in turn, causes the target reserve level to decline. For every 1 SBJused to buy tokens, the target reserve level declines by r SBJ; since $r < 1$ eventually the declining reserve will “catch up” to its more slowly declining target level.

The above algebra shows that we will catch up at $\Delta s = \left(\frac{1}{1-r} \right) (rp(T-t) - s)$ and $\Delta t = \left(\frac{1}{1-r} \right) \left(\frac{s}{p} - r(T-t) \right)$. Running the calculations with the numbers defined in this example gives $\Delta s = -200$ SBJand $\Delta t = 400$ TOKEN.

Let’s check that these computed values $\Delta s = -200, \Delta t = 400$ (a) represent a trade with price 0.5, and (b) that the CRR invariant holds for the new state $M_{new} = (s + \Delta s, t + \Delta t, T, r)$. Calculating $p = \frac{-\Delta s}{\Delta t}$ we indeed get $p = 0.5$. After this trade executes, the market maker has $s_{new} = s + \Delta s = 1200 - 200 = 1000$ SBJ, and $t_{new} = t + \Delta t = 3600 + 400 = 4000$ tokens.

To check condition (b), that the CRR invariant holds, we effectively repeat the analysis in the initial paragraph of this example with the new numbers. We know $M_{new} = (1000, 4000, 12000, 0.25)$ and $p = 0.5$. Then of the $T = 12000$ TOKEN in existence, $t_{new} = 4000$ TOKEN is now held by the MM, so $T-t_{new} = 12000-4000 = 8000$ TOKEN are now circulating. These circulating tokens are worth $p(T-t_{new}) = 4000$ STEEM total, so they “should be” backed by a target reserve level of $rp(T-t) = 4000 * 0.25 = 1000$ SBJ. Since the target reserve level indeed exactly matches the actual reserve level of $s_{new} = 1000$ SBJ, we conclude that the CRR invariant is satisfied after this relaxing trade.

Infinitesimal Trades

This section is fairly technical; the reader will need a good grasp of calculus and differential equations to follow the results.

Setting up the Problem

Suppose we satisfy the invariant condition at some price $p = p_{eq}$; by the CRR invariant $s = rv(p, 0, T - t) = rp(T - t)$. Suppose the price then increases to $p + \Delta p$ and a relaxing trade $\Delta s, \Delta t$ occurs at this new price.

In this section we consider the limiting situation where Δp is infinitesimally small, so we will use Leibniz notation (dp for a small change in p , ds for a small change in s , dt for a small change in t).

Solving the DE's

By applying the substitution $p \leftarrow p + dp$ to the expression for Δs computed in the previous section, we obtain an expression which simplifies to a separable DE which can be solved:

$$\begin{aligned} ds &= \frac{1}{1-r} (r(p+dp)(T-t) - s) \\ &= \frac{1}{1-r} (rp(T-t) + rdp(T-t) - rp(T-t)) \\ &= \frac{1}{1-r} r(T-t)dp \\ &= \frac{1}{1-r} \left(\frac{s}{p}\right) dp \\ \Rightarrow \frac{1}{p} dp &= (1-r) \left(\frac{1}{s} ds\right) \\ \Rightarrow \int \frac{1}{p} dp &= (1-r) \int \frac{1}{s} ds \\ \Rightarrow \ln(p) &= (1-r) \ln(s) + C_0 \\ \Rightarrow p &= k_0 s^{1-r} \end{aligned}$$

Similarly for t , we can start from $dt = -ds/p$ and again obtain and solve a separable DE:

$$\begin{aligned}
dt &= -ds/p \\
&= -\frac{r}{1-r}(T-t)dp/p \\
\Rightarrow \frac{1}{T-t}dt &= -\frac{r}{1-r}\left(\frac{1}{p}\right)dp \\
\Rightarrow \frac{1}{p}dp &= \frac{1-r}{r}\left(\frac{1}{t-T}\right)dt \\
\Rightarrow \int \frac{1}{p}dp &= \frac{1-r}{r} \int \frac{1}{t-T}dt \\
\Rightarrow \ln(p) &= \frac{1-r}{r} \ln|t-T| + C_1 \\
\Rightarrow p &= k_1(T-t)^{\frac{1-r}{r}}
\end{aligned}$$

Qualitative discussion

In a CRR market maker, where does the “backing” for newly emitted tokens come from?

One option is to lower the reserve ratio r . This option results in no immediate market activity, but will weaken the response of the market maker to any future price changes. This is called the “pay later” option.

Another option is to change the dynamical system’s initial conditions, i.e. edit the constants of integration. This option will cause the equilibrium price p_{eq} to drop, meaning the market maker will more aggressively sell tokens to replenish the reserve. If order books are deep compared to the amount of emission, and there are adequate buyers for the tokens, then the sales will be able to replenish the reserve and keep the equilibrium price near its old value; the deep order books provide resistance to the price change being driven by the market maker. If order books are thin compared to the amount of emission, and there are few/no buyers for the tokens, then the equilibrium price will fall, breaking through the thin orders and lowering the market price. Even though few/no many tokens were sold, so even though the *absolute* amount of SBJ in the reserve is still nearly/exactly the same as before, the reserve’s value *relative* to the now-lower market cap of the token has increased to the reserve ratio. This option is the “pay now” option.

FAQ

Q: What is the relevance of constant portfolio ratio policy?

A: It may become a supported market maker policy in the future.

Q: Can the reserve ratio go over 100 percent?

A: No.

Q: Can the reserve ratio be exactly 100 percent?

A: Not with the system described in this paper. It might be possible to code as a special case.

Q: In a CRR market maker, where does the “backing” for newly emitted tokens come from?

A: As blockchain designers, we have two options for sourcing the “backing”. One option is to lower the reserve ratio r . This option results in no immediate market activity, but will weaken the response of the market maker to any future price changes. This is called the “pay later” option.

Another option is to change the dynamical system’s initial conditions, i.e. edit the constants of integration. This option will cause the equilibrium price p_{eq} to drop, meaning the market maker will more aggressively sell tokens to replenish the reserve. If order books are deep compared to the amount of emission, and there are adequate buyers for the tokens, then the sales will be able to replenish the reserve to its target level while keeping the equilibrium price near its old value. The deep order books provide resistance to the price change being driven by the market maker.

If order books are thin compared to the amount of emission, and there are few/no buyers for the tokens, then the equilibrium price will fall, breaking through the thin orders and lowering the market price. Even though few/no many tokens were sold, so even though the *absolute* amount of SBJ in the reserve is still nearly/exactly the same as before, the reserve’s value *relative* to the now-lower market cap of the token has increased to the reserve ratio. This option is the “pay now” option.

Q: Where’s the “don’t pay” option?

A: You have to come up with some answer to where the “backing” for newly emitted tokens will come from. Unless there’s no emission. Or unless there’s no “backing” for any tokens. So the “don’t pay” option would be to have an SBJ with either no emission, or no market maker.

Q: Don’t fractional exponents require floating point to implement?

A: Only if you need fairly high precision (we don’t), don’t care about bit-for-bit reproducibility across compilers, OS’s, CPU’s, etc (we do), and need to do massive numbers of calculations quickly (we don’t). A fast, approximate, all-integer implementation is possible.

Q: Does this market maker interact with the order book through the existing limit order system, or is it a separate set of operations?

A: In theory, it could be implemented either way. However, the likely outcome is that the market maker will be implemented outside of order-book markets to allow its code to be modularized. In practice, if implemented as a completely separate subsystem, people will run arbitrage bots which will trade away any price differences between the reserve system and the existing market system.

Q: Where do the market maker’s initial token balances come from?

A: ICO units can specify the market maker as a destination. An ICO creator may direct a percentage of their ICO’s SBJ contributions to the MM by specifying the market maker similarly to specifying a founder. Or may use the soft cap system to specify all SBJ above a pre-determined amount goes to the ICO. Likewise, a fixed or percentage amount of tokens can be added in the ICO to increase the MM’s token balance.

Q: Can someone send SBJ or tokens to the market maker?

A: Yes.

Q: What are the side effects of sending SBJor tokens to the market maker?

A: The constants of integration are re-initialized, meaning the equilibrium price will change. The market maker will become more aggressive about selling the asset.

Q: Can't this cause manipulation or appropriating the market maker's inventory to private profit?

A: Sending assets to the market maker does cause it to engage in trading activity which affects the price. However, dumping an identical amount on the market will result in a larger amount of trading activity and a larger effect on the price. If Eve is willing to spend her tokens/SBJto manipulate prices, she would prefer the strategy of simply dumping tokens/SBJon the market, as that strategy is more cost-effective for her.

Q: Does the market maker's activity generate profits (losses)?

A: It depends on how you measure "profits". If you measure the value of SBJand tokens in some external third currency such as US dollars or bitcoins, the market maker's inventory, valued in that currency, can definitely increase or decrease. If people voluntarily send SBJor tokens to the market maker, such activity definitely increases the value of the market maker regardless of your measurement.

Another way to define profits is by the constants of integration. If both of the constants of integration increase, or one increases while the other remains the same, a tiny increase occurs with each trade when the market maker is in "taker" mode.

Q: What is "taker" mode? How can a market maker be set to operate in "taker" mode?

A: When orders execute, the order used to set the price is called the maker; the maker's counterparty is the taker. In the SBJ on-chain market (and on almost all trading platforms) the older order is always the maker.

When the market maker is in taker mode, its actions are always considered to be taker orders, which execute at the price specified by the user acting as its counterparty – this price is always at least a little bit more favorable than the market maker is willing to accept. When the market maker is not in taker mode, its actions are always considered to be maker orders, which don't generate changes in the constants of integration.

Taker mode is a runtime parameter that can be set by the SBJ's control account.

Q: Who benefits from the profits of a market maker in taker mode?

A: Maybe nobody, or maybe everybody. It's decentralized.

Q: OK, if my SBJreaches a steady price, the SBJin the reserve is basically locked up forever. That seems not cool. How do I set it up so that this SBJcan be unlocked for the benefits of my SBJusers?

A: Set the DRR (decaying reserve ratio) setup parameter. If you set DRR, then the reserve ratio will slowly drop over time to a pre-set value, using its excess SBJreserves to buy excess tokens. Setting DRR is an excellent, fair, decentralized way to return excess capitalization to contributors in a more-popular-than-anticipated ICO that raises more than the sponsor can effectively spend.

Q: If the reserve ratio can change over time due to pay-later emissions or DRR, it's not really a constant reserve ratio, is it?

A: No, they're not. The reserve ratio's called "constant" because it's constant over the short-term, in normal conditions, or in the conditions in Bancor which is where it was named. But the name could be regarded as slightly misleading.

Q: If the constants of integration can change over time, they're not really constants either, are they?

A: No, they're not. They're called constants of integration because that's their mathematical role in the calculation that introduces them. Maybe they'll be differently named in a future version of this paper.

Q: Can I specify a contribution to a DRR to be a pay-later contribution, that *increases* its reserve ratio, the increase to be eventually negated over time by future decay? Why would I want to?

A: Yes. This is effectively contributing to the market maker, subject to the condition that it's not allowed to immediately dump a portion of the contribution. It's useful if you want to make a large contribution to a market maker without causing it to create a disturbance by immediately dumping a significant fraction of your contribution onto the market.

Q: Can I specify a DRR with emission to use pay-later for emissions when the RR is decaying?

A: Yes.

Q: Is the market maker specified here equivalent to a Bancor token changer?

A: No. A Bancor token changer has multiple reserve ratios that must sum to one hundred percent, and involves a third token that effectively represents equity in the token changer. This paper's market maker has none of these features.

Q: I want to have an initial "price discovery" period where people trade without action from the market maker, then have tokens and SBJ from the ICO gradually flow in over time to the market maker so it has a delayed, slow start from zero to full power. Can I do it?

A: This is called "gradual seeding" and it may be supported.

Q: What about numerical stability?

A: A market maker will be restricted to only operate when its balances exceed a certain minimum for both assets. Also, reserve ratios will be restricted to a certain range, all the mechanisms that can set / increase / decrease a reserve ratio will be restricted to not allow it to move outside the range. Tentative numerical experiments suggests these limits should be about 10,000 satoshis of both assets, 5 percent and 50 percent, respectively. These values are subject to change based on future experimentation, worst-case analysis, and testing.

Costs of SBJ Operations And Bandwidth Rate Limiting

Like SBJ, SBJs can be transferred on the SBJ blockchain with zero fees. SBJ replaces fees with bandwidth rate limiting based on the percentage of SBJ an ac-

count has staked, which means the blockchain calculates how much SBJan account has temporarily vested to determine how much bandwidth the account is permitted for transfers, posting, and other operations across a period of time. In a future version of SBJ, [possession of an account name could permit some small degree of bandwidth to allow for even greater user experience.](#)

Fee-less Operations Necessary for Quality User Experience

Because of bandwidth rate limiting, SBJ may never charge applications or users transaction fees for basic operations such as voting, posting, and transferring tokens. This lack of fees allows SBJbased apps to compete with their non-blockchain counterparts, such as Facebook or Reddit, which certainly do not charge fees for actions such as ‘Like’ and ‘Upvote’. If these applications did charge fees, adoption would suffer.

Decentralized Exchange

One of the valuable features of SBJs is their immediate access to functioning unmanned markets against the liquid asset, SBJ.

Automatic Order Matching

The Decentralized Exchange (DEX) structures of SBJallow assets to be automatically matched for best possible price when bids and asks overlap, unlike other DEXs - which require a “man in the middle” or user-agent to match orders. Automatic, rather than middle-man-facilitated, order matching is important for the security of SBJ-based assets, and for the replicability and safety of DEX interfaces.

Diverse Asset Types

There are several assets that SBJusers and creators will have access to by way of the SBJDEX: SBJ, SBD, SBJs, and Simple Derivatives (IOUs). These neighboring assets can increase the visibility and network effect of all created SBJs.

SBJis the gateway token for assets issued on SBJ, staying relevant by acting as the bandwidth usage measuring stick across SBJ’s SBJs. SBJis also the common denominator asset, acting as a trading pair for all of SBJ’s SBJs.

SBD (SBJBlockchain Dollars) are an experimental asset on SBJthat relate to the US Dollar, originating with SBJ’s launch in 2016. It is unclear if SBD will bring value to holders of USD as they will compete, possibly poorly, with USD IOU tokens; however, SBDs will bring value to speculators.

SBJs as described in this proposal are an important part of growing the token ecosystem, and bringing crypto assets to the mainstream. SBJs will trade against SBJacross the DEX.

Simple Derivatives (IOUs) will be possible via SBJissuance. For instance, if an SBJ is issued without inflation or rewards pool properties, then the issuer can reliably back

the token with another real world asset such as bitcoin or USD. In this instance, the issuer could create a business functioning as a gateway, by trading their IOU for BTC or USD. Users would buy the IOU to gain access to the SBJDEX. This market would add diversity and value flow to the SBJecosystem, while adding to the DEX's network effect.

Zero Trading and Transfer Fees

The SBJDEX is the first DEX to exist without trading fees, to the benefit of SBJ creators and traders alike. This is made possible by [bandwidth rate limiting](#) (described in the original SBJWhitepaper and Bluepaper), as the process by which the blockchain calculates transaction “prices” on a per byte basis, and deducts transaction bandwidth available to an account temporarily. These “prices” are an internal blockchain accounting and do not debit any token balances.

Augmenting SBJs with Additional Native Contracts

There are several potentially valuable programmable contracts that are not in the immediate scope of SBJs, however, these contract capabilities can be created as modular, follow-on projects that increase the creativity entrepreneurs and communities may apply to growth of SBJecosystems.

Community Building with Paid Positions

SBJcommunities may be bolstered with paid positions, guild roles, or jobs that are defined in programmable, native smart contracts and matched with continuously elected participants. Rewards received through the elected position come from some portion of the token's Founder allocations or donations that are sent to a paid position contract. Paid position contracts may be defined for length of position, frequency and volume of payments, particular token used for stake-weighted elections, percentage of the token required for a participant to be elected, and how tokens in paid position contracts are socialized or forfeited given no participant is elected.

The paid roles may be leveraged to support various applications, games, and businesses built around an SBJ. A contract for a paid position, the position's reward schedule, and the voting thresholds required to elect an account into a paid position may be created by anyone for a fee. To establish the purpose of these positions, job descriptions or constitutions that encourage adherence to performance expectations may be established by the issuer or the token's community. There can be an unlimited number of paid positions, and paid position contracts can receive any amount of a token's Founder allocations or community donations. The types of paid positions that may be employed includes everything from front end developer, to evangelist, including educational content creator, business development representative, and many roles that have yet to be imagined.

Democratic SBJs using Whitelist Oracles

SBJs represent completely open access to tokens, however, some entities may wish to enable one-whitelisted-account, one-vote-per-post and X-number-of-target-votes-per-day algorithms to increase their token's potential for accurate wisdom-of-the-crowd content discovery mechanics and the democratic nature of their token community. To incorporate this, the Rewards Pool for a token will need to have a manageable whitelist that can be enabled only at launch. Whitelist management may be handled by the entity launching the token or outsourced to an identity management service, such as Civic or Jumio. The service would need to publish a feed of SBJ usernames for known/identified people into the SBJ blockchain, along with periodic updates to ensure accuracy of the whitelist. As the blockchain pays rewards to a token, it verifies the account receiving the token is on the whitelist, otherwise the tokens are returned to the reward pool.

Secondary ICOs for Contiguous Fundraising

Entrepreneurs leveraging SBJs to finance ventures may want to have the option to perform token auctions after the initial launch of the token. The entrepreneur can reserve Founders tokens at launch and earmark them for later sale, however, they may want to auction these tokens rather than sell them into Bid/Ask order books or sell them OTC. To enable secondary auction-style ICOs, a secondary auction contract may be established. This contract requires definitions for when an ICO begins and how long it lasts, as well as lockup periods for the tokens purchased. The lockup period allows the tokens to be sold at a discount to the open markets and attract investment capital that would otherwise stay out of the market. The entrepreneur will send tokens to this contract prior to the beginning of the auction and the tokens will be distributed to the auction participants immediately following the close of auction period.

Bandwidth Sharing with SBJs Based on Reserve Liquidity Pools

SBJs that use ICOs to create Automated Market Makers to boost token liquidity will inherit bandwidth rights proportionate to the amount of SBJ in the Automated Market Maker's reserve pool. This bandwidth inheritance confers transaction rights from SBJ to all the of the "powered up" and vested SBJ, basically permitting SBJ owners to transact proportionate to their stake of SBJ without owning SBJ outright. Bandwidth Sharing based on liquidity pools enables new tokens to operate with an even higher degree of independence while still contributing proportionate value to SBJ.

What Makes SBJs Better Suited to Application-Specific Blockchains, such as SBJ, than Application-General Blockchains, such as Ethereum?

Throughout the history of software and hardware development, it has been observed that specialized systems have the potential to greatly outperform generalized systems. An example of this can be seen in [GPUs outperforming CPUs](#) through specialization, which was followed by [ASICs outperforming GPUs](#) for particular tasks. In turn, some

wonder how a specialized blockchain, such as SBJ, which hosts application-specific programmability, and static mechanics embedded in consensus, is more suited to SBJs than application-general, open-programmability blockchains, such as Ethereum, which hosts [turing-complete](#) (“infinitely”) programmable smart contracts in a layer beyond consensus, and has shown its use for discovering new cryptocurrency concepts. Without delving into SBJ’s advantages in network effect and developer team experience, the advantages for SBJs on SBJ can be seen through a set of computer science, consumer safety, and economic perspectives.

SBJs are Safer and More Cost Effective in Application-Specific Blockchain Environments

The value of SBJs in a native, specialized-programmability environment, such as SBJ, comes from reliability of the code and efficiencies created by that reliability, whereas application-general platforms, such as Ethereum and Tezos, require costly and highly-assumptive audits on each new token and issuer to be deemed safe. Some of these application-general protocols claim to have [formal verification](#), which is valuable, however, the majority of the audit cost remains due to the need to audit the issuer’s choice of token mechanics, choice of client for writing the code, and semantics of custom code written to the token. Enabled by the purposeful design of its code, SBJ enables SBJs to support static (versus dynamic) crypto-economic properties that can be tuned after the token’s launch without each change potentially harming their token holders. The purposeful delineation between economic properties that should be static versus dynamic makes the necessary token audits for safety simple and inexpensive to accomplish.

To elucidate this issue, imagine someone is offering you 20% of their currency in exchange for \$100 USD. You will have additional questions for the seller - essentially questions to audit tertiary realities of the deal, such as: “does the seller maintain a right to print more currency and therefore dilute me?” In SBJs, holders of SBJs will be able to rely on the core economics of the SBJs they purchase due to static nature of the SBJs economic properties - such as emissions or inflation rates, which cannot be changed by the issuer after launch. Therefore, there can be no unexpected new currency emissions to harm the consumer. In application-general, open-programmability blockchain protocols, such as Ethereum and Tezos, there can be no such platform-spanning design principles and reliabilities that protect consumer safety.

SBJ on SBJ have Aligned Proof-of-Brain Incentives with the Core Token

Unlike SBJ, core tokens (such as ETH) that do not carry Proof-of-Brain content rewards cannot offer monetization, primed active user-base, shared influence and bootstrapping benefits to new SBJ communities. SBJ, on the other hand, is able to lend its reward pool features and primed-user base to new networks, to help them bootstrap, market, and become successful independent clusters of participants on the network. Conversely, some entrepreneurs will identify and choose a strategy to employ SBJs largely independent from SBJ, and like ERC20 to Ethereum, SBJs can run while only having SBJ run in the background to calculate the necessary bandwidth for transaction costs

SBJ on SBJ Have Transaction Pricing that Contributes to a Quality User Experience

Whether operating with bandwidth rate limiting, or outright fees, no general purpose blockchain will price transactions effectively for more than a small fraction of its applications, and SBJs would have reduced user experience (UX) on application-general blockchains (such as Ethereum) as a result. The clear example is that on blockchains such as Ethereum, there are outright fees for all transactions, however, no content publisher would expect users to pay fees to leave comments or likes on their articles. With SBJs on Ethereum, those fees would be required, which makes Ethereum a non-starter as an SBJplatform.

Unlike Ethereum, some open-programmability blockchains of the future may use bandwidth rate limiting as transaction costs, however, bandwidth rate limiting requires fine tuning to meet the UX requirements of specific applications. As an example, in SBJ, bandwidth rate limiting is specifically tailored to support content applications and their user interactions by leveraging bandwidth rights according to two objects: amount of token ownership, and account ownership - and it's taken over a year of production-level research to refine the optimal bandwidth allowances to each. In general purpose, open-programmability platforms, the burden and the need for accurate pricing may hinder the ability for applications to have their users' actions priced appropriately, and the problem may be exacerbated as a greater myriad of potential application experiments come to exist, stretching and sharing the blockchain's resources. Therefore, blockchains that support native application-specificity may yield more suitable transaction pricing, as it pertains to the UX with tokens in related applications.

SBJs Benefit from a Blockchain that has Scaling Processes Programmed to a Specialized Set of Applications

In blockchain scaling there are cutting-edge concepts of “sharding” (originated by Vitalik Buterin and the Ethereum project) and “multi-threaded parallelism” (originated by Michael Vandenberg of SBJ) that refer to how blockchains may scale by allowing multiple operations to occur at once. General purpose platforms (such as Ethereum) are a great test bed for these approaches to scaling, however, a platform that takes advantage of all the product-market fit discovered by Ethereum, that then applies it to a more specialized, iterative-upgrading model, such as SBJ, can scale its processes more effectively to meet the demand discovered by that product-market fit.

Looking to the 90s and early 00s for analogy, when the computer science world started writing code specifically optimized for GPUs, the boundary pushing for greater scale occurred through FPGAs: field programmable gate arrays, which are chips that allow the programmability of the set of logic gates into the form of any conceivable circuit, allowing for effectively a prototype ASIC (albeit with higher power consumption). This is not quite the same performance per watt as an ASIC, but orders of magnitude faster than a CPU for particular tasks. As these platforms move to more and more generalizations, such as the idea that any contract may call on any other contract, they will move further away from ability to optimize for scale, as contracts that call on all other contracts can reduce the capacity for multi-parallel processing to single-core processing. By analogy, like CPUs do not optimize better than GPUs, platforms like Ethereum, GEOS, and Tezos do not optimize better than Turing-incomplete application-specific blockchains like

SBJ. These CPU-like blockchains will be bottlenecked by unpredictable processing requirements, while the ultimate blockchain platforms will be specially-designed, like SBJ, and will scale by optimizing in the way FPGAs were optimized for parallel algorithms.

SBJ Benefit from a Blockchain with Content Management System (CMS) Primitives

Unlike application-general blockchains, such as Ethereum, that inherently avoid application-specific primitives at the core of the protocol, SBJ offers a structured public content database for storing plain text and generic structured data in tandem with content primitives that developers can build from: Account Names, Posts, Comments, Votes and Account Balance. These primitives benefit the blockchain-based applications by helping to establish application-interoperability and rapid developer on-boarding. Without these primitives, second order databases need to be structured specifically for a blockchain-based application, which may give rise to many second-order application-specific databases competing with each other. The rise of multiple second layer content databases splits the potential network effect for the blockchain as a content management system (CMS), and reduces the potential for application-interoperability, which provides consumer safety benefits by allowing end users to move fluidly from one blockchain-based application to another.

Increasing Market Demand for SBJ with SBJ and Implicit Value Drivers rather than Fees

There are several new value drivers to SBJ with the creation of SBJ.

SBJ Purchased for Transaction Bandwidth Enables Maximally Profitable Participation across SBJs

With the advent of SBJ, there is growing demand for users to hold SBJ, because users need to increasingly hold SBJ in order to participate, consume, and use SBJ services at a rate maximally commensurate with their growing potentials in respective SBJ ecosystems. Put simply, as power users are growing their earning potential in SBJ communities, they need more SBJ to achieve the bandwidth allowance needed to perform at their highest possible rate of return in SBJ ecosystems. At an application level, the demand for bandwidth may be satisfied by users or by businesses, which can delegate surplus bandwidth to their users.

SBJ Supply is Locked into Liquidity Pools by Automated Market Makers

Each SBJ that leverages Automated Market Makers augments the ratio of demand for SBJ to available supply of SBJ. The effect of the Automated Market Maker to SBJ is that each Automated Market Maker represents a permanent holding pool for SBJ, which represents a decrease in available supply. Given demand were to stay

equal, the price of SBJs caused to rise with the advent of each new Automated Market Maker.

SBJ and SBJ Demand Increases with Advent of New Powers of Influence

From a potential utility perspective, demand for SBJ increases as each SBJ is created with Influence Sharing for SBJ Power over a SBJ's rewards pool. The advent of each trace of SBJ Power-based Shared Influence over an SBJ's Reward Pool gives new rights and usage to SBJ, which in turn drives demand for SBJ. These rights can also be granted from SBJ to SBJ, and the flow of value follows an identical pattern.

SBJ Demand Increases with Proliferation of SBJ ICOs

At a platform level, other cause for demand may include exclusive financing opportunities, such as ICOs, which attract new capital into ecosystems, first flowing into the base asset, SBJ, and then flowing into SBJs. Increased capital in the ecosystem due to ICOs always presents an opportunity for net positive capital retained in SBJ, and at worst, a wash on the value of the base asset, where all of the SBJs sold by the organization making the offering. The example of the worst case scenario is that an ICO occurs and \$100 USD buys SBJ to buy the ICO'd SBJ, then 100% of the SBJ received by the ICO is sold for USD - and no explicit net effect related to the value of SBJ. However, even when the net effect contribution of an ICO to the value of SBJ is apparently zero, it is an implicit net benefit in terms of attention received by SBJ and the SBJ ecosystem, if we consider all new attention valuable. Further, it is reasonable to expect, based on the behavior of ICOs in Ethereum, that the majority of the SBJ received by the ICO'ing organization will continue to be held on a speculative or promissory basis, therefore creating holding value.

SBJ: The World's Advertising Network

Along with these new value creating mechanisms, it is imperative to recognize the original value created for SBJ as an implicit attention and advertising network that now applies to all SBJs that utilize Proof-of-Brain rewards. Smart Media Tokens, such as SBJ, have inherent curation properties, such as their Rewards Pools, that give them reliability and credentials as an implicit advertising network. The Rewards Pool in SBJs demands that fully-SBJ-integrated interfaces, such as SBJit.com, respect the pending SBJ payouts on posts and then rank these posts from highest to lowest pending payout in pages often referred to as "Trending" - such that the posts can be audited by the community of SBJ holders. The effect of this, which applies equally to SBJ as other SBJs, is a sorted "Trending" page that users (bloggers, vloggers, advertisers) can reliably use to evaluate the potential returns on buying higher placement on the page to attain more attention, and then these participants make decisions to *buy or rent SBJ and SBJs to promote content*. Through this process, as advertisers choose to buy and rent SBJ/SBJs to gain exposure, demand for SBJ/SBJs increases. These value driving properties can be described in a way similar to "Ethereum: the world computer", but instead as "SBJ: The world's advertising network."

SBJ Ecosystem Support for SBJ

Integrating SBJ into Websites and Apps

APIs and Documentation

To be continuously updated for SBJs. Current SBJAPIs exist here: <http://SBJ.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html> and <https://SBJit.github.io/SBJit-docs/>

Shared Tools for Account Creation, Key Signing, and Wallet Functions

Several shared tools exist to support applications that wish to outsource signup, transaction signing, and wallet functions - such as [SBJ Connect](#). SBJ Connect enables applications to support SBJs while the applications are backed by entrepreneurs who may have little to no cryptocurrency experience.

Conclusion

Through a combination of specialized designs for open asset-issuance, bandwidth rate limiting as transaction costs, permanent-availability of content, real-time transaction speeds, autonomous distribution of tokens, decentralized exchange, automated market making and ICO contracts, SBJ offers the premier token protocol for publishers across the internet.

References

- [1] SBJit, Inc., 2017. SBJbluepaper. A protocol for bringing smart, social currency to publishers and content businesses across the internet. (<https://www.SBJ.io/SBJ-bluepaper.pdf>)
- [2] Eyal Hertzog, Guy Benartzi & Galia Benartzi, 2017. Bancor Protocol. Continuous Liquidity and Asynchronous Price Discovery for Tokens through their Smart Contracts. (https://about.bancor.network/static/bancor_protocol_whitepaper_en.pdf)

Appendix

Implementation Notes

Here is a timeline / state diagram of the events in an SBJlaunch:




Figure 10: Timeline of SBJ Launch

SBJ naming standards

- An SBJname should consist of 3-10 uppercase ASCII letters (A-Z).
- An SBJname should not equal SBJ, SBD or VESTS.

Asset directory standards

A *directory* maps each NAI to one of the following states:

Listed
 Deprecated
 Unlisted
 Blacklisted

Each possible asset name is mapped to one of the following states:

Free
 Reserved

A **Listed** or **Deprecated** NAI has an associated name, which should be listed as **Reserved** in the mapping.

UIs may provide *asset directory union* functionality to augment directories by combining multiple asset directories into a single asset directory. Asset directory union should use the following algorithm to resolve situations where an NAI is listed differently by different directories:

- (1) If the NAI is **Blacklisted** in any component directory, return **Blacklisted**.
- (2) If the NAI is **Listed** or **Deprecated** in multiple component directories, and all of the component directories *do not* agree on the associated name, return **Unlisted**.
- (3) If the NAI is **Listed** in at least one component directory, return **Listed**.
- (4) If the NAI is **Deprecated** in at least one component directory, return **Deprecated**.
- (5) Return **Unlisted**.

Likewise, here are the rules for resolving names listed differently by different directories:

- (1) If the name is **Reserved** in any component directory, return **Reserved**.
- (2) Return **Free**.

A dynamic directory (based on a URL or blockchain account) should not be cached more than 5 minutes.

UI guidelines for SBJnames

- A UI may, but need not, have a default asset directory.
- A UI may choose to hide unlisted NAIs.
- A UI should allow users to override or augment the UIs defaults with their own asset directories.
- A UI should reconsider hiding unlisted NAIs in which the user has actively transacted.

Operational guidelines for asset directories

- An asset directory should not confuse users by setting a well-known NAI to refer to a different name, or setting a well-known name to refer to a different NAI.
- An asset directory should make the process for listing clear to both SBJ creators seeking to add their asset to the directory, and UI developers considering adding the directory to their UI.

Asset directory formats

URL and file-based asset directories will be a JSON format. The details will be developed concurrently with the implementation. Blockchain-based asset directories will use a custom JSON operation. Again, the details will be developed concurrently with the implementation.

Unit Tests

The details of the unit tests will be developed concurrently with the implementation.